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Contra Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch:
Originalists Should Adopt A Living
Constitution
R. RANDALL KELSO*
Two main approaches appear in the popular literature
on constitutional interpretation: originalism and nonoriginalism. An originalist approach refers back to some aspect of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action to justify
a decision. A non-originalist approach bases the goal of constitutional interpretation in part on consideration of some
justification independent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent
or action.
What is often unappreciated in addressing the question
of whether to adopt an originalist or non-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is the complication
that emerges if one concludes that the framing and ratifying
generation believed in the model of a living Constitution.
Under such a model, later legislative, executive, or social
practice, or judicial precedents, can change the meaning of
a constitutional provision. Thus, while standard originalist
supporters share the premise that the original meaning of
constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is
framed and ratified, interpretation according to originalism
actually does not commit the interpreter to a static or fixed
interpretation of the Constitution. Instead, a true originalist
form of interpretation can incorporate the principle that the
provision was capable of evolution over time.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Two main approaches appear in the popular literature on constitutional interpretation: originalism and non-originalism.1 As classically defined, an originalist approach refers to some aspect of the
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action to justify a decision.2 A nonoriginalist approach bases the goal of constitutional interpretation in
part on consideration of some justification independent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action.3
Among originalists, there is a debate whether the framers’ and
ratifiers’ “original [subjective] intention” should govern (intent)4 or
whether one should look instead to the “original meaning” of the
words adopted by the framers and ratifiers (action).5 Even among
1

See generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59
DUKE L.J. 239, 241 (2009) (“For the last several decades, the primary divide in
American constitutional theory has been between those theorists who label themselves as ‘originalists’ and those who do not.”) (footnote omitted); INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 3–10 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1990).
2
See generally Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2009) (“By this they
meant the sense intended by the people who wrote and ratified it.”); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981)
(“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive,
the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to
accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”) (citation omitted).
3
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238–39
(2015) (noting interpretation theories of purposivists, living constitutionalists,
textualists, legislative intentionalists, and originalists); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is
Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 194 (2015) (noting approaches called “democracy–reinforcement, ‘moral readings,’ minimalism,
or broad deference to political processes” in addition to originalism) (footnotes
omitted). For a classic discussion of non-originalist approaches or, in his terminology, “non-interpretivist” approaches, see Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 263–65
(1981).
4
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977) (specific historical intent should
be the focus of constitutional interpretation); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme
Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV.
455, 456, 465 (1986) (arguing for a “jurisprudence of original intention”).
5
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“We look for
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each of these two approaches, there are variations. For example, under the “original intent” model of interpretation, is it specific or general historical intent that is most critical?6 For “original meaning,”
is it literal text or purpose that is the most critical in terms of textualist interpretation?7

a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris . . . .
And the reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government,
to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawmaker meant, rather than
by what the lawgiver promulgated . . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent of
the lawgiver.”). But see Kay, supra note 2, at 703–04 (while noting that the proponents of “original meaning” seemed to have “carried the day,” “recourse to
original intentions is more consonant with the values underlying the originalist
approach to interpretation”).
6
As elaborated by Professor Richard Fallon,
One helpful division distinguishes between ‘specific’ or ‘concrete’ and ‘general’ or ‘abstract’ intent. Specific intent involves
the relatively precise intent of the framers to control the outcomes of particular types of cases . . . . Abstract intent refers to
aims that are defined at a higher level of generality, sometimes
entailing consequences that the drafters did not specifically
consider and that they might even have disapproved.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198–99 (1987). Professor Ronald
Dworkin has made the same point using the terms “conceptions” to describe the
specific, discrete ideas or examples held by individuals, while “concepts” are the
broader, more abstract idea reflected in the conceptions. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 70–71 (1986). For further discussion, see CHARLES D. KELSO &
R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.2.3.2, at 156–59
(updated 2017 ed. 2007), available at http://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=36280424.
7
In considering constitutional text, as in considering statutory text, a judge
must decide whether to read only the text literally, and thus risk missing the spirit,
or purpose, behind why the text was adopted, or whether to interpret the provision
in light of both its letter and spirit. Justice Holmes once wrote, “[T]he general
purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or
formal logic may lay down.” United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905)
(citation omitted). Professor Lon Fuller once asked, “[I]s it really ever possible to
interpret a word in a statute without knowing the aim of the statute?” Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 664 (1958). On the other hand, it has been noted that purposes are elusive, and that judges may see purposes in the text that reflect the judge’s own
views, rather than the views of the drafters. See R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Con-
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In most cases, the result would be the same under either an original intent or an original meaning approach.8 For this reason, as Justice Scalia acknowledged, “[T]he Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether
stitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U.L. REV. 121, 129 (1994). Supporters of literal interpretation are concerned that attempting to determine a provision’s purpose, or purposes, is not a clear, mechanical process that can yield
unambiguous results. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 532–
34 (1988); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1627 (1991).
In terms of interpretation theories prevalent when the Constitution was drafted, it
has been noted,
[T]he over-all purpose of a document was stated carefully in
general terms; details were put in, only where, for some particular reason, details seem required; and the rest was left to the
rules of interpretation customarily followed by the courts. [This
mode of interpretation was] calculated to give a just and wellrounded interpretation to every document, in the light of its declared general purpose; or, if its purpose is not declared, then,
in the light of its apparent purpose, so far as this could be discovered.
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 364 (1953). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The
Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 952–64
(1993); Stephen F. Williams, Rule and Purpose in Legal Interpretation, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 809, 809–11 (1990); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 383–84 (1985). For further discussion of
literal versus purposive interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.12,
at 140–43.
8
In a few cases, there can be an important difference. For example, from an
originalist approach focused on specific historical intent, the overruling of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), may well have been flawed since segregated schools existed in 1868, even
in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 117–27, 363–72
(specific historical intent should be determinative, and Brown’s overruling of
Plessy is unjustified). But see infra note 109 (noting debate over whether Brown’s
overruling of Plessy is consistent with specific historical intent). From an original
meaning perspective, Justice Scalia indicated his view that the clear text of the
Equal Protection Clause requires a color-blind Constitution that overrides specific
historical traditions, thus supporting the Court’s overruling of Plessy in Brown.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”9 This is
the issue on whether to adopt a static or living model for constitutional interpretation.10
What is often unappreciated in addressing this question is the
complication that emerges if one concludes that the framing and ratifying generation believed in the model of a living Constitution. Under such a model, later legislative, executive, or social practice, or
judicial precedents, can change the meaning of a constitutional provision.11 This is true whether one adopts an original subjective intent
or original meaning approach. In either case, it would be faithful to
their theory of interpretation to interpret the Constitution today differently than they would have interpreted it years ago. In short, while
it has been noted that standard originalist supporters share the premise that “the original meaning (‘communicative content’) of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified,”12 interpretation according to any version of originalism does
not commit the interpreter to a static or fixed interpretation of the
Constitution. Instead, a true originalist form of interpretation can incorporate the principle that the provision was capable of evolution
over time.
Part II of this Article summarizes the four main judicial decision-making styles that exist regarding constitutional interpretation.
Part III then summarizes the argument that the overwhelming historical evidence suggests that the framers and ratifiers believed in a
living Constitution model of interpretation. Thus, when Justices
Scalia and Thomas adopted, or newly-confirmed Justice Neil Gorsuch potentially adopts, a static or fixed approach to constitutional
interpretation that seeks to determine how the framers and ratifiers
would have decided the case in 1789 (or 1791 for the Bill of Rights,

9

SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38.
See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 693–95 (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 11–12, 24–28;
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 165–66 (discussing differences between “static”
and “living” constitutional interpretation).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 52, 60–62, 87–149; KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 6, at 159–65; Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 244–45.
12
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013).
10
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or 1868 for the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses),13 they are not following either the historically valid
original intent or original meaning of the Constitution. A “true
originalist” model of interpretation would focus on how the framers
and ratifiers intended the meaning of the words they used to evolve
over time in response to later legislative, executive and social practice, and judicial precedents, i.e., how the framers and ratifiers
would interpret the Constitution if they were alive today.
Without historical support for the standard version of originalism, which adopts a fixed or static model of constitutional interpretation, its proponents are left with only the argument that such an
approach is better, even if it was not shared by the framers and ratifiers.14 Part IV of this Article discusses the arguments why such
standard originalism should not be preferred on normative grounds.
Part V provides a brief conclusion and notes that the proper approach to constitutional interpretation on both original intent and
normative grounds is to interpret the Constitution in the manner that
the framers and ratifiers would expect it to be interpreted today.15
That approach is best reflected on the modern Supreme Court in the
interpretation approach of Justice Kennedy, and former Justices
O’Connor and Souter.16 Such an approach represents what this Article calls a “true originalist” interpretation.
Justice Scalia made very clear his preference for a “static” or “fixed” constitutional interpretation based on “original meaning.” See SCALIA, supra note 5,
at 38–39. Concerning Justice Thomas’ theory of interpretation, see Bradley P.
Jacob, Will the Real Constitutional Originalist Please Stand Up?, 40 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 595, 649 (2007) (arguing that Justice Thomas is even more of a committed
originalist than Justice Scalia). Regarding Justice Gorsuch, see Max Alderman &
Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to
Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 185 (2017).
14
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 91, 102–17 (2004). See also infra text accompanying
notes 179–82.
15
This approach is consistent with Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why
and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540 (2013) (discussing “authorially intended meaning”); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 442–54 (2007) (discussing the difference
between “original meaning,” which is consistent with a living Constitution model
of interpretation, and “original expected application,” which reflects fixed or
static meaning).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 102–05, 86, 124–29, 144–49.
13
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II.

THE FOUR STYLES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
As is discussed more in-depth elsewhere,17 jurisprudentially,
there are two main questions that lie behind any act of judicial interpretation. The first concerns the nature of law: analytic versus functional.18 The second concerns the nature of the judicial task: positivist versus normative.19 Combining the two responses to these two
17

This discussion in Part II is an abbreviated version of material presented in
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 19–62, 99–133.
18
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 35. Under one approach, law is seen
primarily as a set of rules and principles whose application is guided by an analytic methodology of logic and reason, i.e., the analytic, or conceptualist, approach. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD OF THE LAW 95–99 (rev. ed. 1974). Alternatively, law ultimately can be
judged not in terms of logical consistency, but as a means to some social end
through a pragmatic or functional treatment of rules and principles, i.e., the functional, or pragmatic, approach. Id. at 111–33.
[L]egal ordering [under an analytic approach] is not the collective pursuit of a desirable purpose. Instead, it is the specification
of the norms and principles immanent to juridically intelligible
relationships. [This approach] repudiates analysis that conceives of legal justification in terms of some goal that is independent of the conceptual structure of the legal arrangement in
question.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 964–65 (1988).
The dominant tendency today [under a functional approach] is
to look upon the content of law from the standpoint of some
external ideal that the law is to enforce or make authoritative.
Implicit in contemporary scholarship is the idea that the law
embodies or should embody some goal (e.g., wealth maximization, market deterrence, liberty, utility, solidarity) that can be
specified apart from law and can serve as the standard by which
law is to be assessed.
Id. at 955 (footnotes omitted).
19
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 35. This question asks whether judicial decision-making should be separable from morals or social values, i.e., should
judges view law solely as a body of rules and principles from which legal conclusions are derived—the positivist assumption—or should judges view law as a
body of rules and principles testable by reference to some external standard of
rightness, some social or moral value – law as normative or prescriptive, not descriptive. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 18, at 91–109, 134–68. A judge could
aim at producing decisions and opinions that are “good law” in the narrow sense
of being clear, certain, and predictable, and unquestionably within the legitimate
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questions creates four judicial decision-making styles: formalism
(analytic positivism); Holmesian (functional positivism); instrumentalism (functional normative); and natural law (analytic normative).20
Focusing on constitutional interpretation, any interpreter must
decide, among other things, how much weight to give to arguments
about: (1) the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text, and the text’s
purpose or spirit; (2) the context of that text, including verbal or policy maxims of construction, related provisions in the Constitution or
other related documents, like the earlier enacted Articles of Confederation, and the structure of government contemplated by the Constitution, including issues of federalism and separation of powers;
(3) the historical evidence concerning the intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution; (4) the legislative, executive, and social
practice under the Constitution; (5) the judicial precedent interpreting the Constitution; and (6) the prudential considerations about the
consequences of a particular judicial decision.21
power of the court. Such judges are typically described as following a “positivist”
approach to judicial decision-making. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 799–802 (1993). In contrast, a judge could aim at
producing law and applications of law that accord with certain moral principles
embedded in a society’s legal and moral culture. Judges adopting this more “normative” perspective view the judge’s role as requiring the judge to give some
weight to the moral insights and traditions that lie behind legal rules and that may
develop over time. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1063 (1975) (“[W]hat an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends
upon both the practice and the justice of its political institutions.”).
20
See infra text accompanying notes 25–48; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6,
at 35–62. See also R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and
the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal
History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 150, 184–218 (1994); R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal
Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 40 (1997).
21
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 5.1, at 99–100. A similar set of
sources for constitutional interpretation—text, including context; history; structure/theory; precedent and practices; and prudential/value considerations—appears in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3–12
(2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407,
409 n.11 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION (2001)); See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–119 (1982) (discussing arguments of text, structure, history, doctrine (precedent), and prudential and ethical considerations).
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These sources—text, context/structure, history, practice, precedent, and prudential considerations—can be organized under two
broad headings: contemporaneous sources of meaning and subsequent considerations.22 Contemporaneous sources are those that existed at the time a constitutional provision was ratified.23 These include: (1) the text of the Constitution; (2) the context of that text,
including related provisions in the Constitution or other related documents, and the structure of government contemplated by the Constitution; and (3) the history surrounding the provision’s drafting
and ratification.24 Subsequent considerations involve matters that
occur after the constitutional provision is ratified.25 These include
the sub-categories of: (4) legislative, executive, and social practice
under the Constitution; (5) judicial precedent interpreting the Constitution; and (6) prudential considerations, which involve judicial
speculation concerning the consequences of any particular judicial
construction, including arguments of justice or sound social policy.26 Naturally, use in constitutional interpretation of such subsequent sources leads to a living Constitution, which changes over
time. As Justice Scalia once remarked, “[t]he ascendant school of
constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called
The Living Constitution, a body of law that . . . grows and changes
from age to age . . . .”27
As is discussed below,28 in terms of the four judicial decisionmaking styles, from a fixed or static approach to constitutional interpretation, typically adopted by formalists, judges should resort
only to contemporaneous sources of interpretation, i.e., (1)–(3)
listed above; Holmesian judges will place greater reliance on (4)
legislative and executive practice; natural law judges will place
22

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 5.1–5.3, at 99–125.
See id. § 5.1, at 100.
24
See id. The term “contemporaneous sources” conforms to usage by Justice
Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985)
(Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the
States’ ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding . . . .”).
25
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 5.1, at 100.
26
See id.
27
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38.
28
See infra text accompanying notes 31–71.
23
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greater reliance on a reasoned elaboration of (5) judicial precedents;
and instrumentalist judges will be willing to resort to (6) prudential
considerations of social policy.29
A.
Formalist Constitutional Decision-Making
One approach to judicial decision-making is represented by analytic, positivist judges who combine a focus on certain, predictable
treatment of existing positive law with an insistence on logical rule
application.30 Such judges have generally been called “formalists”
because they concentrate on the formal aspects of law––technical
rule manipulation in light of a statute’s or constitution’s words, and
the literal holdings of common-law precedents.31 Under a positivist
theory of law, the formalist sees the judge as a neutral arbitrator who
attempts to decide cases in light of existing positive law.32 With an
analytic, positivist theory of law, formalism has a preference for
clear, bright-line rules that are capable of logical, mechanical application, rather than doctrine phrased as balancing tests, factors to
weigh, or general standards.33

29

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.4.4, at 171.
See id. § 3.1, at 35.
31
Id. Under this approach, law is viewed as a closed system of related rules
to be logically or mechanically applied. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607–09, 614–20 (1908). It has been noted,
“Formalists generally viewed the law as a relatively closed system of conceptions
and axioms from which judges and others could deduce resolutions of almost any
issue.” Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century
American Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General
Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 889–90 (1981) (citing
Pound, supra). The formalist approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation similarly focuses on the logical elaboration of existing statutory or constitutional text. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 39–41 nn.14–22.
32
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40. See also Schauer, supra note 7,
at 521 (“To be formalistic, it is said, is to be enslaved by mere marks on a printed
page.”) (footnote omitted). See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 527 (1999).
33
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–88 (1989).
30
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This emphasis on deciding according to existing positive law
supports formalist judges adopting a static or fixed view of constitutional interpretation.34 However, as Justice Scalia noted, this approach does not necessarily adopt a strict, or narrow, construction of
constitutional provisions.35 Indeed, Justice Scalia stated, “[This] is
not strict construction, but it is reasonable construction.”36 The term
“textualism” is not used in this Article to describe this interpretation
style because all four judicial decision-making styles start their statutory and constitutional analysis with text.37 In any event, Justice
Scalia embraced the term “formalism,” as he emphatically asserted,
Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the
most mindless is that it is “formalistic.” The answer
to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule of law
is about form . . . Long live formalism. It is what
makes a government a government of laws and not
of men.38
B.
Holmesian Constitutional Decision-Making
A second kind of judge combines a positivist emphasis on certain, predictable treatments of existing law with the functional view
that legal rules are always means to societal ends.39 Given this view
of legal rules, purely logical treatment of existing law is not sufficient to carry out the judicial task.40 Judges who adopt this view may
be called “Holmesians” after Justice Holmes, whose famous statement was that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”41 As pragmatic functionalists, Holmesian judges are
sensitive to the purposes behind relevant legal rules and texts to apply the doctrine in a way best calculated to achieve its intended

34

See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38–41, 45–47.
See id. at 38–39.
36
Id. at 38.
37
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 39.
38
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 25. For further treatment of the formalist approach
to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 278–302.
39
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 41.
40
See id.
41
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). See also
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 41.
35
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ends.42 However, as positivists, Holmesian judges believe that the
judicial task is merely to interpret existing law, with any changes in
the law coming from the other branches of government, the legislative or executive branch.43 As Holmes stated, “[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the
actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or
wrong.”44
Given this understanding, the role of the law in Holmes’ view
was to accommodate what the dominant group in society wants.45
Indeed, as Professor G. Edward White noted,
Holmes’ job at the Supreme Court consisted of, in
many instances, reviewing the constitutionality of
actions of a legislature. In such cases Holmes forged
his famous attitude of deference, which was seen as
humility and ‘self-restraint’ by admirers and had the
added advantage of sustaining ‘progressive’ legislation about which a number of early 20th-century intellectuals were enthusiastic . . . . [I]n the 1950’s and
1960’s a similar version of deference would have
perpetuated malapportioned legislatures, racially
segregated facilities, the absence of legal representation for impoverished persons, and restrictions on the
use and dispensation of birth control devices.46
Professor Grant Gilmore noted that for Holmes, “if the dominant
majority . . . desires to persecute blacks or Jews or communists or
atheists, the law, if it is to be ‘sound,’ must arrange for the persecution to be carried out with, as we might say, due process.”47
42

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 41.
See id.
44
HOLMES, supra note 41, at 41.
45
See G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes’ Jurisprudence, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 657 (1982) (“While a constitution was ‘made for people
of fundamentally differing views,’ the views that counted were those of the majority.”) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
46
Id. at 655, 667 (footnote omitted). On this aspect of Holmes’ jurisprudence,
see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV.
254, 254 (1963).
47
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49–50 (1977).
43

2017]

CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH

125

For these reasons, the Holmesian deference-to-government approach is the style most properly viewed as a strict construction approach to the Constitution, at least in cases involving individual
rights challenges to the constitutionality of governmental action.48
For structural issues of federalism or separation of powers, a deference-to-government approach does not call for strict construction of
governmental powers, but rather for a deferential approach toward
governmental powers.49 This deference-to-government posture
means that Holmesian judges are the most willing to permit legislative and executive action to act as a gloss on meaning to the Constitution.50 To this extent, the Holmesian approach rejects a static
model of constitutional interpretation in favor of a living Constitution.51 This is true so long as that living Constitution derives its support from legislative or executive action, rather than judicial consideration of general moral principles or social policy.52
C.
Instrumentalist Constitutional Decision-Making
The instrumentalist approach to constitutional interpretation involves resorting to background moral principles and social policies
in cases where leeway exists in the law following consideration of
the text and purpose of constitutional provisions.53 Because of the
48

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 46. See also White, supra note
45, at 656–58.
49
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 46. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 986–87, 994–96 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (legislative and executive
practice should override text of Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses to make
a legislative veto provision constitutional).
50
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 46.
51
See id.
52
See id.; see, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 694–96, 704–06 (supporting
Justice Holmes’ approach toward a “living” Constitution model of interpretation);
Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 603–06 (2013). For further treatment of the Holmesian
approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6,
§ 10.1, at 303.
53
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 47–48. See, e.g., STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6–
12, 115–32 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 1–8 (1996); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1343–47 (1988) (comparing, inter alia, Ronald Dworkin’s
natural law theory, which permits use of background “principles” to aid interpre-
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general nature of many constitutional provisions, such as due process, equal protection, or freedom of speech, a greater percentage of
constitutional cases tend to involve more leeway than in the case of
statutory interpretation.54 Followed faithfully, however, the instrumentalist approach to constitutional interpretation is not an invitation to unbridled judicial activism.55 For example, Justice Brennan
once noted that he grounded his approach to the Constitution in
terms of a concern with “human dignity” shared by the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and
thus part of the Constitution’s background context, not his personal
views.56 Nevertheless, because of the potential for greater judicial
activism represented by the instrumentalist approach, instrumentalist judges are most often criticized for deciding cases based on
grounds that the decision reflects a supposed community consensus,
or values a judge thinks the community eventually will hold, or a
“judge’s own values.”57 Instrumentalist judges are thus often described as judicial activists by their detractors.58
Because even a moderate instrumentalist judge considers actual
background social policies of contemporary society as one source of
constitutional interpretation, the instrumentalist approach rejects the
formalist model of a static or dead Constitution.59 Instead, the instrumentalist approach favors a living Constitution that draws its
breath not only from the text and purpose of the framing and ratify-

tation, versus pragmatism’s additional use of social “policies”). For further discussion of principles versus policies, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 2.4, at
30–34.
54
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 47–48.
55
See id. at 53.
56
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 439–45 (1986).
57
John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16–22, 43–52 (1978).
58
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 69–100 (1990); BERGER, supra note 4, at 288–99; LOUIS
LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 273–310 (1975). See also JOHN DENTON CARTER,
THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM ix–xii (1973).
59
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 54.
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ing generation, but also from the history and traditions of contemporary society.60 Unlike the Holmesian deference-to-government
approach, the instrumentalist approach does not limit this living
Constitution to support from positive governmental action—that is,
recent action of the legislative and executive branches.61 Instead, the
living Constitution embodies many sources, including contemporary social views in America and Western civilization generally, recent judicial precedents, and prudential consideration by judges of
contemporary social policy.62
D.
Natural Law Constitutional Decision-Making
Societies typically have positive legal enactments—constitutions, statutes, and a record of prior judicial decisions—and in deciding cases, natural law judges, like all other judges, will examine
those enactments very carefully.63 Regarding constitutional interpretation, however, judges in the natural law decision-making tradition will be quite careful to ask whether the drafters included natural
law principles in the Constitution.64 As Dean Roscoe Pound observed in 1938, “In studying the formative era of American law we
are concerned immediately with the eighteenth-century natural law
which became embodied for us in the Declaration of Independence

60

See id.; see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 247–50 (2002).
61
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 54.
62
See id.; see, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 388–90 (1989)
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“Where
organizations with expertise in a relevant area have given careful consideration to
the question . . . there is no reason why that judgment should not be entitled to
attention as an indicator of contemporary standards,” and these standards might
involve legislative enactments or views of social organizations “in other countries” as part of an evolving consensus among nations), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 (2004); Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265 (2003); For further treatment of the instrumentalist approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra
note 6, at 325–53.
63
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.4, at 55.
64
See id.
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and is behind our bills of rights.”65 Natural law thinkers might also
take natural law principles into account in passing statutes.66 As
Dean Pound noted,
[T]he believers in eighteenth-century natural law did
great things in the development of American law because that theory gave faith that they could do them.
Application of reason to the details of the received
common law was what made the work of the legislative reform movement of enduring worth. Some of
its best achievements were in formulating authoritatively what men had reasoned out in the era of the
school of the law of nature in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.67
It must be acknowledged that certain more radical versions of
natural law theory may be as willing as versions of instrumentalism
to let moral principles outside those natural law principles reflected
in the Constitution affect constitutional interpretation.68 On the other
hand, the natural law theory of our constitutional tradition, as espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, James
Madison, and others during the framing and ratifying period, held
that judges should consider only the background moral principles
that emerge from considering the Constitution.69 This flows from
viewing the natural law philosophy of our framers and ratifiers as
primarily influenced by Enlightenment natural law theory, and the
Enlightenment’s social contract conception of the nature of government and the proper role of the judiciary in such a society to follow

65

ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (photo. reprint 1960) (1938).
66
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 55.
67
POUND, supra note, 65, at 27.
68
This possibility is discussed infra note 119 and accompanying text.
69
See infra text accompanying notes 89–101. For an example of the Marshall
Court following principles in the Constitution itself, rather than background natural law, and thus being unwilling to hold slavery was unconstitutional under the
original Constitution despite its evident immorality from the perspective of natural law, see Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall
Court and the Legitimation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532, 533–34 (1969).
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the social contract as set out in a written Constitution.70 It is important to remember, however, that the Ninth Amendment is a textual reminder that the framers and ratifiers believed citizens retained
rights not enumerated in the Constitution, thus supporting the modern constitutional doctrine of “unenumerated” fundamental rights.71
III.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE SURROUNDING THE APPROACH OF
THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS

A.
General Observations
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, virtually all discussion and writing about law and theories of interpretation approached
the topic from the perspective of some version of natural law.72 As

70

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 55–56. Professor Kermit Hall has
noted: “Natural law theory and the social contract gave American public law its
emphasis on limiting governmental power. If government violated the social contract and if it denied natural rights and abused public trust, the people retained a
right to overthrow it.” KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 58 (1989). See also Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 133–37 (1989) (concluding that we do not have
an unwritten Constitution, and that judges should only resort to principles in the
Constitution itself).
71
On this natural law background, see David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights
Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J.
313, 313–19 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1987). See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6,
at 1044 (discussing the text of the Ninth Amendment, which provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”). For further treatment of the natural law
approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at
278–302.
72
The discussion in Section III.A of this Article is an updated, and shortened,
version of an earlier work by this author. See R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law
Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1051,
1053–56, 1074–79 (1995). See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 367–83 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the
natural law tradition of Locke, Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Grotius, among
others); Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 292–309
(2014) (discussing the interpretation theories of Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, Bacon, and Blackstone, among others); Edward S. Corwin,
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this Article discusses,73 the traditional eighteenth-century natural
law model of interpretation treated repeated legislative or executive
practice, or a reasoned elaboration of precedent, as relevant to constitutional meaning, in addition to text, context, purpose, and history. In considering constitutional interpretation actions after a constitutional provision was ratified, the framers’ and ratifiers’ generation necessarily rejected a static or fixed version of constitutional
interpretation.
As is discussed below,74 there were two competing approaches
in the eighteenth century to which the framing and ratifying generation would have turned for guidance: the classic/Christian natural
law tradition and the Enlightenment natural law tradition. Under the
classic/Christian tradition, the ultimate source of rights is God’s reason and will.75 Under the Enlightenment tradition, the ultimate
source of natural rights is based upon human reason.76 This led to
placing a high value on freedom of speech and religious toleration,
and it supported a belief in “civil peace, material prosperity through
economic growth, scientific progress, and rational liberty.”77

The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 157 (1928).
73
See supra note 7; infra text accompanying notes 113–40, 159–94. For further discussion on the basic elements of this natural law approach see KELSO &
KELSO, supra note 6, at 354–404.
74
See generally infra text accompanying notes 75–84; Kelso, supra note 72,
at 1053–56.
75
As has been noted, this tradition is “classical and Christian, in the tradition
of Cicero, Aquinas, Hooker, and Burke.” JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 69 (2d prtg. 1990). See generally DOUGLAS W.
KMIEC, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND
PHILOSOPHY 1 (3d ed. 2009) (analyzing “constitutional law by considering a number of ideas from early thinkers which have been influential in the forging of the
American constitutional order”).
76
See Kelso, supra note 72, at 1055 (“[T]he Enlightenment . . . tradition is
‘characterized by its rationalism, secularism, and radicalism . . . . [and] rejected
the divine origin of natural law, exalt[ing] the autonomy of human reason’ . . . .”)
(quoting MCCLELLAN, supra note 75, at 70–71).
77
ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18
(1985). The Enlightenment natural law tradition includes the English, Scottish,
and French Enlightenments. This seventeenth-to-eighteenth-century tradition included such writers as Locke and Berkeley of the English Enlightenment; Hutchenson, Hume, and Adam Smith of the Scottish Enlightenment; and Montesquieu,
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Determining the precise influences on the framers and ratifiers
at the time of the founding is likely to be somewhat controversial.78
This is particularly true among aspects of the eighteenth century natural law Enlightenment tradition.79 Similar debates can be made re-

Rousseau, and Voltaire of the French Enlightenment. See William Bristow, Enlightenment, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017 Edition), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/. Under these
approaches, rights derive from man and man’s reason. Id. (noting the Enlightenment is sometimes called “the Age of Reason”). As Professor Jefferson Powell
has noted, the Enlightenment tradition of rational liberty is based on an “understanding of human nature as constituted by ‘basic deliberative capacities’ and by
the potential for ‘some measure of self-direction.’ On that basis, liberalism pursues ‘the preservation and enhancement of human capacities for understanding
and reflective self-direction’ as ‘the core of the liberal political and moral vision.’”
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 225 (1993) (quoting
SMITH, supra, at 200–01).
78
For example, as between the Enlightenment tradition and the classical/Christian natural law tradition, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century civic
Republican tradition is probably best viewed as more part of the Enlightenment
tradition. As has been noted,
[w]hile some advocates of the civic republican interpretation of
the founding view republicanism as antithetical to liberalism,
republicanism is better understood as a possible historical complement to liberalism . . . . Even those whose commitment to
Enlightenment politics was the most undeniable [citing James
Madison, among others] saw no inconsistency in invoking the
necessity of [the civic Republican concept of] civic virtue to
free government as well.
POWELL, supra note 77, at 67, 69 (footnotes omitted). See also Suzanna Sherry,
Public Values and Private Virtue, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1099, 1099–1104 (1994)
(complementary nature of civic Republicanism and liberalism); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 679, 688–90
(1992) (discussing Locke and various versions of civil republicanism).
79
For example, there is a debate over whether the framers and ratifiers were
influenced more by Lockean or civic Republican ideology. Professor Mark Tushnet has noted:
The liberal [Lockean] tradition stresses the self-interested motivations of individuals [sometimes called possessive individualism] and treats the collective good as the aggregation of what
individuals choose . . . . Although it acknowledges the role of
public institutions in providing the framework for individual
development, the liberal tradition insists that such institutions
be neutral toward competing conceptions of the good and tends
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garding events leading up to the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and
Equal Protection clauses.80

to emphasize the risks of governmental overreaching. The republican tradition, seeing public institutions as important means
by which private character is shaped, is less suspicious of government.
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (1988). As this discussion suggests, and Professor Tushnet noted, “[A]s the framers considered questions of fundamental institutional design, they discovered that liberalism and civic republicanism converged on some
important matters.” Id. at 7. For a more recent discussion of the similarities and
differences between Lockean and civil Republican ideology, see Jack M. Balkin,
Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 31, 31–36, 44–55 (2017)
(reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016)).
There are also debates over the influence on the framers and ratifiers of the
Scottish versus the English Enlightenment. For example, the Declaration of Independence phrased “unalienable” rights as rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness,” reflecting the “moral sense” of the Scottish Enlightenment of Frances
Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and their view of “sympathy,” rather
than “life, liberty, and property,” thus reflecting the focus of Locke and the English Enlightenment. See generally GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA:
JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 168–80 (1978); GARRY WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 66–71 (1981); Robert G. Natelson, A
Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independence, 91 KY. L.J.
353, 358–82 (2003). The Scottish Enlightenment was closer in this manner to the
civic Republican tradition, and the French Enlightenment’s phrasing of “liberty,
equality, and fraternity.” The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of
course, adopted the Lockean concept that no person may be deprived of “life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.” This phrasing was also used in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. However, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), a foundational case for the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process doctrine, the
Court concluded “liberty” includes “those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,” invoking the
Scottish Enlightenment phrasing. On these varied influences, see ALAN GIBSON,
INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE
ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC ix (2006).
80
For example, there could have been debates over the influence of Adam
Smith or John Locke during the pre-Civil War period leading up to the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 13.1, at 405–
09 nn. 5–16 (citing, inter alia, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 1–9 (1977)). Further, there can be a debate sur-
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However, any specific substantive disagreements among the
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural law approaches are not
critical from a focus on static versus living constitutional interpretation, as each viewed natural rights as an evolutionary project of
greater, and a more enlightened, understanding of the demands of
reason as applied to human nature.81 That more precise understanding would lead all of these traditions toward a convergence of their
views based on that new understanding.82 Further, each viewed constitutional interpretation as intended to carry out the purposes of the
framers and ratifiers, with those purposes influenced by the natural
law tradition and an expectation that the then-current natural law
style of drafting documents would be understood and applied so that
courts would interpret legislation and the Constitution in light of that
tradition.83 While that model likely adopted more of an objective
original meaning approach toward interpretation, rather than a subjective original intent,84 whether the focus is on the framers’ intent
rounding the influence of classic/Christian versus Enlightenment natural law reasoning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly as it affected the
Federalist, Democratic, Whig, Republican, and other political parties. See KELSO
& KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.1, at 262–63 nn. 66–71, 265–66 nn. 85–88. See also
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 72, at 361–67 (discussing the ideological origins
of the Reconstruction amendments).
81
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.1, at 270.
82
See id. For discussion of the elements of that developed understanding of
the requirements of moral reason, and their similarity to foundational religious
moral principles such as “love of neighbor as thyself,” see infra notes 216–26 and
accompanying text; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 505–48. See also R. Randall
Kelso, Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and
Other Rights Decision-Making Around the World, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 433,
434–40 (2011).
83
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 270. See also supra note 7; infra text
accompanying notes 84–149.
84
See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8–12 (1991); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887–902 (1985). For
example, the prevailing mode of interpretation in the United States and England
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century took the view that it was improper to consider the legislative history of a provision to help determine its meaning. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.3.1, at 150. Thus, notes of the Constitutional Convention, or statements made on the floor of the House and Senate
during consideration of the first ten amendments, were not proper to consider,
while contemporaneous statements about the meaning of the Constitution that
were not part of the formal legislative history, but were part of the public dialogue
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at the Constitutional Convention, the ratifiers’ intent at the state ratifying conventions, or the original public meaning, all adopted a natural law approach toward interpretation.85
Both the classical/Christian and Enlightenment natural law traditions, in whatever version, shared many aspects of the commonlaw methodology of judicial decision-making.86 The eighteenth and
nineteenth-century natural law judicial decision-making tradition
utilized a wide range of arguments regarding constitutional interpretation, including “considerations of constitutional text, purpose, and
structure; the history of the framing and ratifying period; subsequent
judicial precedents; and subsequent legislative and executive practices under the Constitution,” which were held to constitute a gloss
on meaning.87 Under a natural law approach, arguments of practice
and precedent are held to constitute a gloss on meaning that alters
what the Constitution means, consistent with a living model of constitutional interpretation.88
It has been noted that this mode of reasoning, dependent on judicial tradition, was shared by Madison on the Republican side of
prior to ratification, like The Federalist Papers, were proper to consider. See id.;
see generally Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1040–43 (1991); Tutt, supra note 72, at
299–300 (interpretation should be based on “objective” interpretation based on
common usage of words at the time the instrument was drafted, “unless there are
good Conjectures to the contrary.”). This limitation gradually died out during the
nineteenth century in America. Thus, notes of the Constitutional Convention or
House or Senate statements about constitutional amendments became proper to
use as history to determine the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent. See Baade, supra, at
1055–64. Early natural law opinions are thus more “textualist” than later natural
law opinions, which involve more historical “originalism.” See GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 7–12 (discussing the early textualist nature of Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinions). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.1.1, at 137 n.11;
§ 12.2.1.3, at 362–63 nn. 35–38.
85
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 270.
86
See id. See also Kelso, supra note 72, at 1057.
87
Kelso, supra note 72, at 1057. See also Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 619, 688–97 (1994); Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation
and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 310–12,
317–28, 334–49 (2014).
88
See infra text accompanying notes 120–29 (on legislative and executive
practice); infra text accompanying notes 130–49 (on judicial precedents). See also
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 12.2.2.1–12.2.2.2, at 364.
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early American politics, and by Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John Marshall on the Federalist side.89 As Professor Jefferson
Powell observed, “[Madison] consistently thought that ‘usus,’ the
exposition of the Constitution provided by actual governmental
practice and judicial precedents, could ‘settle its meaning and the
intention of its authors.’”90 It has been noted:
‘Among the obvious and just guides applicable to interpreting the Constitution,’ Madison listed:
1. The evils and defects for curing which the Constitution was called for & introduced.
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was
adopted.
3. The early, deliberate and continued practice under
the Constitution, as preferable to constructions
adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the
vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.91

89

See POWELL, supra note 77, at 95–100.
Powell, supra note 84, at 939 (footnotes and citations omitted). See also H.
Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1513, 1539–42 (1987) (providing fuller treatment of Madison’s views).
91
David M. O’Brien, The Framers’ Muse on Republicanism, The Supreme
Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism, 8 CONST. COMM. 119, 145
(1991) (alterations and citation omitted). See also DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST
OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 74–76, 78–80
(1989). Madison is also famous for stating, “I entirely concur in the propriety of
resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the
nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.” Letter from James
Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON]. See also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and
Supermajoritarianism: Defending the Nexus, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1919, 1929 n.38
(2007). While this quote has been used to argue that Madison favored a static form
of originalism, see id. at 1930, this quote actually supports a living Constitution
form of interpretation, once it is understood that the historical evidence supports
the view that the “sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified” was
the natural law model of interpretation. As Madison also noted, one should follow
the “‘established rules of interpretation’ in construing that [constitutional] meaning.” Id. at 1929 (citing Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (July 5,
90
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A Burkean approach to interpretation is similar. As Professor
Ernest Young noted, “Burke placed little reliance on the original
structure and theoretical underpinnings of institutions; rather, institutions become effective in meeting the needs of society through a
continuing process of adaptation that may or may not be consistent
with the original intentions of the founders[.]”92 In 1833, Justice
Story similarly supported the practice of drawing inferences from
congressional, executive, and state acquiescence in “more than forty
years” of “full operation” under the Constitution, and from “the
practical exposition of the government itself.”93
James Madison’s views on the constitutionality of Congress authorizing a national bank provides a good example of these principles at work. Based upon legislative, executive, judicial, and social
practice, James Madison changed his position between 1791 and
1816 on the constitutionality of Congress incorporating a national
bank.94 Indeed, he noted in a letter to Congress in 1816 that, while
he opposed the bank in 1791 in part on constitutional grounds, he
now viewed a national bank as constitutional based upon “repeated
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an
institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial

1830), reprinted in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 376. Those “established rules” for Madison reflected consideration of purpose, history, legislative
and executive practice, and judicial precedents (“usus”). See Powell, supra note
84, at 939. In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton suggested that “[t]o avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts,” they should follow “rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). The established “rules and precedents” in the eighteenth century supported the natural law model of interpretation. Support for a social contract theory
of government—such as in Abraham Lincoln’s famous comment, “[N]o man is
good enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent”—is illustrative.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Ill. (Oct. 16, 1854), reprinted in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 266 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953). The
Peoria Speech is also consistent with the natural law model of interpretation
adopted in this Article. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
92
Young, supra note 87, at 664.
93
JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 391, 408, at 363, 392 (1833). For discussion of Story’s belief in natural
law, see MCCLELLAN, supra note 75, at 85–86.
94
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.3.1, at 160.
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branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.”95 The
Supreme Court emphasized legislative/executive practice and precedent, stating in its opinion considering the issue in McCulloch v.
Maryland, “[t]he principle now contested was introduced at a very
early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive
legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in
cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.”96
The Court also paid deference to legislative practice in other
early cases. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court stated, “Hence
[the Constitution’s] powers are expressed in general terms, leaving
to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to [mold] and model the exercise of
its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require.”97 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court stated,
If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that
subject . . . . Yet this power has been exercised from
the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation.98

95

PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed. 2006) (citation omitted). For the views of
Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and others on the constitutionality of the national
bank in 1791, see id. at 27–37. Alternatively, it could be argued that Madison’s
change of heart regarding the bank’s constitutionality was based only on Madison
changing his view on the “necessity” of the national bank, given his experience
with the War of 1812, and thus Madison’s change was consistent with a fixed,
static view of constitutional interpretation merely interpreting in light of new
knowledge what was “necessary” under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See,
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 190–94 (2003). However, that is not the reason
Madison gave in his letter signing the bank bill, which focused on later legislative,
executive, judicial, and social practice, as quoted above, nor is it consistent with
Madison’s support throughout his life that such later action (“usus”) can fix the
meaning of the Constitution. See BREST, supra, at 37; Powell, supra note 84, at
939.
96
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
97
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326–27 (1816).
98
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
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McCulloch v. Maryland also provides a good example of natural
law interpretation, focusing not only on the literal text of the Constitution, but also on arguments of purpose and constitutional structure. As is stated in McCulloch:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit,
and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by
the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its
great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves . . . . It is also, in some degree,
warranted by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and
just interpretation. In considering this question, then,
we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.99
Reflecting support for a living constitution model of interpretation, Chief Justice Marshall also noted for the Supreme Court in
McCulloch:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To
have prescribed the means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would
have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by
immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at
all, must have been seen dimly, and which can best
be provided for as they occur. To have declared that
the best means shall not be used, but those alone
99

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis in original).
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without which the power given would be nugatory,
would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.100
Justice Story similarly noted for the Supreme Court in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee,
The constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in
framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide
for minute specifications of is powers, or to declare
the means by which those powers should be carried
into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a
perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task.
The instrument was not intended to provide merely
for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which
were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.101
100

Id. at 415–16 (emphasis in original).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816). See also Feldman, supra note 87, at
288, 306–310, 317–28, 334, 350 (noting that neither the Justices nor treatise writers nor framers and ratifiers of the founding era adopted any kind of static “reasonable man” concept for constitutional interpretation, but, consistent with “living
constitutionalism,” and with “natural law,” they adopted a range of arguments
based on text, context, purpose, constitutional structure, history, legislative and
executive practice, and precedents) (citing, inter alia, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810); and Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)). Professor Feldman calls this approach “eclecticism” or “pragmatism.” Feldman, supra note 87,
at 288. Consistent with the terminology in this Article, it is better to style it as
“natural law,” since, as Feldman details, the Justices used pragmatic arguments to
the extent they reflected constitutional, text, content, purpose (including the Constitution’s preamble), history, and legislative or executive practice, which is consistent with natural law interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6,
§ 12.2.2.1, at 364, but did not use their own sense of social policy separate from
that plausibly related to the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent. To the extent “pragmatism” suggests instrumentalist use of contemporary social policies that might be
reflective of the judge’s own sense of social policy, not that of the framers and
101
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Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have noted that their approach
does not adopt the static view of the Constitution. For example, they
stated in United States v. Lopez:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today
that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in
two senses: first, because the Framers would not
have conceived that any government would conduct
such activities; and second, because the Framers
would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the
Federal Government by the Constitution were
phrased in language broad enough to allow for the
expansion of the Federal Government’s role.102
During his confirmation hearing in 1989, Justice Souter described this approach as following the original meaning of the Constitution, rather than following the framers’ and ratifiers’ specific
original intent.103 Justice Souter stated, “[Justices ought to identify
the] principle that was intended to be established as opposed simply
to the specific application that that particular provision was meant
to have by, and that was in the minds of those who proposed and
framed and adopted that provision in the first place.”104 This is consistent with interpretation by Chief Justice John Marshall, of whom
it is understood
carefully distinguished between the conscious, specific, concrete policy goal that may have motivated a
particular constitutional clause, on the one hand, and
the broader, more generalized principle, or rule of
ratifiers, see supra note 53 and infra note 119, that does not reflect early Supreme
Court practice.
102
514 U.S. 549, 574–75 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
103
See David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 25,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/magazine/justice-souter-emerges.
html?pagewanted=all.
104
Id. See generally Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 613–19 (1998) (discussing “principles” versus “original practices”).
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law, that the clause established, on the other hand.
For Marshall, constitutional law consisted of the latter rather than the former.105
Brown v. Board of Education106 represents a good example of
the difference between static, specific intent at the time of ratification and a broader, more general concept that can evolve over time.
As is discussed by Professor Ronald Dworkin in his book Law’s
Empire, “conceptions” are the specific, discrete ideas or examples
held by individuals, while “concepts” are the broader, more abstract
idea reflected in the conceptions.107 As elaborated by Professor Fallon:
An example comes from equal protection jurisprudence. The authors of the fourteenth amendment apparently did not specifically intend to abolish segregation in the public schools. Yet they did intend generally to establish a regime in which whites and
blacks received equal protection of the laws – an aspiration that can be conceived, abstractly, as reaching
far more broadly than the framers themselves specifically had intended.108

105

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 84, at 9. Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
noted during her confirmation hearing, that the general concept of equality in the
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is broad enough to embody a principle of equal rights for women,
despite the fact that the specific views of Thomas Jefferson and others in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not ready for women to be equal participants
in public life. During her confirmation hearing, Justice Ginsburg, quoting Jefferson, stated that “[t]he appointment of women to public office is an innovation for
which the public is not prepared . . . . Nor, Jefferson added, am I,” but then noted
that she presumed that if Jefferson were alive today he would have a different
specific view on the role of women in public life based on the general concept of
equality in which he believed—each individual’s equal and unalienable right to
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” See The Supreme Court; Excerpts
from Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/21/us/the-supreme-court-excerpts-from-senate-hearings-on-the-ginsburg-nomination.html?pagewanted=all.
106
347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
107
DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 70–71.
108
Fallon, supra note 6, at 1199 (citations omitted).
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Thus, despite the fact that segregated schools were common in
1868, including in the District of Columbia, a justice faithful to the
general concept of equality placed into the Fourteenth Amendment
could hold, as in Brown, that segregated schools deny individuals
equal protection.109 To the extent that the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had natural law moral principles in mind,
they would have intended to place into the Fourteenth Amendment
that general concept of equality, not to control later decisions by
their specific historical practices.
In short, a natural law approach does not commit the judge to
the view that the concepts embedded in the Constitution have a static
content that, when applied to specific problems, have an unchanging
meaning.110 From an Enlightenment perspective, it has been noted,
“No great political theory, including Locke’s, is the last word on its
own best interpretation, and critical advances in political theory may
enable us better to understand and interpret the permanent truths implicit in the theory and to distinguish these from its lapsing untruths.”111 From a Burkean perspective, “the limits of human rationality require a constitution that can adapt in response to the unforeseen difficulties, changed circumstances, and outright mistakes that
any human endeavor will inevitably entail.”112 From a classic/Christian Augustinian perspective, it has been noted that constitutional
concepts are “timeless principles of human nature and political order,” but, with respect to the framers and ratifiers, “[l]ike any of us,
their immediate preferences were sometimes at odds with, and certainly did not exhaust, their aspirations.”113
109

On the issue of whether, in any event, arguments of history support the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, compare Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 949–55 (1995) (discussing aspects of historical intent support Brown) with Michael J. Klarman,
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–1914 (1995) (discussing history at the
time of ratification does not support Brown).
110
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.3.3, at 382.
111
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
13 (1989).
112
Young, supra note 87, at 668–69.
113
GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHT: CURRENT PROBLEMS, AUGUSTINIAN PROSPECTS 153–56 (1990) (citation omitted).
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Under such an approach, a person who wishes to consistently
apply a general concept in which the individual believes may have
to adjust one or more specific views, which currently are not consistent with that general concept.114 Through this process, a dynamic
is created whereby, over time, more of an individual’s specific views
will be a reflection of reasoned elaboration of general moral concepts applied to current social realities. This is in contrast to specific
views merely being the product of the individual’s past experiences,
unthinking adherence to tradition, idiosyncratic preferences, or prejudice.115 This is similar to the view that the principles in foundational religious documents, like the Bible, do not change, but that
our understanding of the content of those principles can change,
such as the difference between traditional and progressive religious
understandings regarding slavery, anti-Semitism, and whether the
earth revolves around the sun.116
From a natural law interpretation perspective, the framers and
ratifiers would wish later generations to give that concept the more
enlightened and progressive reasoning, since they were not putting
into the Constitution their own fixed, subjective, specific views
about some matter, but rather, were placing into the Constitution
broad natural law principles whose content they believed was independent of their specific views, and which would better be discovered over time through the application of reason.117 As responsible
believers in natural law, the framers would have been somewhat
more humble than those who support a fixed, static Constitution
give them credit concerning whether their reasoning at the time of
ratification fully reflected a complete understanding of the natural
114

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 383.
See id.
116
On this topic, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 16.1, at 505–09. Note
that this evolution in constitutional meaning consistent with (a) more enlightened
understanding of general concepts, (b) legislative, executive, and social practice,
and (c) judicial precedents is different than arguing meaning should change based
on contemporary dictionary definitions of words, as opposed to common meaning
at the time of ratification. No less an authority than James Madison warned,
“[w]hat a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all of its ancient
phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.” BARNETT, supra note 14, at
99 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted
in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 91, at 191.
117
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 383.
115
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law principles in which they believed.118 Justice Kennedy phrased
this point well when he wrote for the Court in 2003:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more
specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.119
118

See id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). Of course, an Enlightenment perspective is more likely than a Burkean or Augustinian perspective to
embrace fully an evolved understanding of the general intent lying behind a natural law concept, since the Burkean perspective is tied more closely to evolution
based on tradition, not reason, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105
MICH. L. REV. 353, 366–71 (2006), and the Augustinian perspective is also wary
of the competencies of human reason. See WALKER, supra note 113, at 159 (“[I]f
all interpreters partake of a morally vitiated human nature themselves, then responsible judges will be modest, wary, and self-critical as they interpret the Constitution—especially since their interpretive decisions affect many other people.”).
This form of natural law interpretation does not support a more activist
model of interpretation, where judges could resort to natural law principles
thought best by the judge, even if not embedded in the Constitution. See Walter
F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 712
(1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 709 (1975). Such suggestions are really a form of instrumentalist interpretation whereby contemporary social policies, with no connection to the Constitution, are appropriate to consider. On instrumentalist constitutional interpretation, see supra text accompanying notes 53–62; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at
325–53. On “instrumentalism” generally, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6,
§ 3.3, at 47–54; Summers, supra note 31, at 863–74, 908–23. The “true originalist” approach to interpretation described in this Article, where judges should resort
only to natural law principles reflected in constitutional text, is consistent with the
social contract natural law approach dominant during the framing and ratifying
period. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 69–70; GOLDSTEIN, supra note
84, at 2–3, 12–33; Moore, supra note 70, at 133–37 n.71. Even Justice Chase’s
famous resort to natural law in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798),
119
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B.
Legislative, Executive, and Social Practice
Legislative or executive practice under a constitutional provision can provide a gloss on meaning to the Constitution, in addition
to illuminating the meaning at the time of ratification. Such a gloss
changes the meaning of the Constitution from what it was before,
and thus is embraced by those who adopt a living Constitution as
their model of constitutional interpretation. As Justice Story observed in 1833, “[T]he most unexceptionable source of collateral interpretation is from the practical exposition of the government itself
in its various departments upon particular questions discussed, and
settled upon their own single merits.”120
James Madison similarly noted about interpretation in 1830 that
“[t]he early, deliberate and continued practice under the Constitution, as preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions,
and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies” is
relevant in determining constitutional meaning.121 As noted previously,122 although as a congressman in 1791 Madison had opposed
Congress creating a national bank as unconstitutional, in 1815 and
1816, when Madison was President, he supported the bank’s constitutionality based upon “repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.” Thus, for Madison, Congress’ power to create a bank changed from 1791, when Madison considered it unconstitutional, to 1815 and 1816, when it became constitutional, based
in part upon legislative and executive practice and social understandings (the “general will of the nation”).
In the twentieth century, Justice Frankfurter made this same
point in the specific context of executive action. In Youngstown

is best understood in this light. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.2.2.3, at
369–71 nn.72–79. A related issue of interpretation regarding statutory interpretation according to the “equity of the statute” is discussed infra note 206.
120
STORY, supra note 93, at 392.
121
O’Brien, supra note 91, at 145 (quoting Letter from James Madison to
M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 91, at
370, 372.
122
See supra text accompanying note 95.
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President . . . .123
Like Madison’s resort to the “concurrence of the general will of
the nation” in his signing statement regarding the constitutionality
of a national bank,124 most natural law jurists are willing to consider,
at least to some extent, social understandings or practices regarding
the meaning of constitutional provisions. For example, in Atkins v.
Virginia, the majority, which included Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, acknowledged social understandings as part of its consideration of whether the death penalty for mentally challenged
criminals was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.125 Natural law judges should be willing to consider
even social practice from other countries, not for its social policy
value, but to the extent that practice helps illuminate a reasoned
elaboration of a universal natural law concept placed into the Constitution, something judges did during the original natural law era.126
123

343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 95.
125
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). In contrast, the dissent noted,
[T]he Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws, the
views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion
polls . . . is antithetical to considerations of federalism, which
instruct that any ‘permanent prohibition upon all units of democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts
(law and the application of laws) that the people have approved.’
Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.).
126
See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 574–83 (2001) (discussing judicial practice from
1789 through the Civil War); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution,
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2006) (discussing cases where the Constitution refers to
international law or international law is used as a background principle to identify
124
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Since many of the framers and ratifiers believed in natural law,
many of the individual rights in the Constitution were likely intended to have such a universal natural law base.127 Naturally, international sources that can best shed light on that natural law concept
would be most properly used, such as European decisions regarding
aspects of basic human rights and human dignity.128 For example,
this explains why it was European views against banning homosexual sodomy, rather than views of other nations around the world that
were used by Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas.129
C.
Judicial Precedents and a Living Constitution
Under the natural law approach, a sequence of judicial precedents interpreting a constitutional provision can provide a gloss on
meaning that can modify the framers’ and ratifiers’ initial specific
views. As Professor Powell has noted when discussing the writings
of James Madison, under the traditional natural law model,
usus, the exposition of the Constitution provided by
actual governmental practice and judicial precedents,
could ‘settle its meaning and intention of its authors.’
Here, too, [Madison] was building on a traditional
foundation: the common law had regarded usage as
valid evidence of the meaning of ancient instruments,
and had regarded judicial determinations of that
meaning even more highly.130
As Madison himself said, “All new laws, though penned with
the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,

the territorial scope of the Constitution or the powers of the national government,
or delineate structural relationships within the federal system or individual rights
cases).
127
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.2.2.1, at 365.
128
See id. at 366.
129
539 U.S. 558, 560, 576 (2003) (discussing, among other things, the “values
we share with a wider civilization,” including opinions of the European Court of
Human Rights).
130
Powell, supra note 84, at 939 (footnotes omitted).
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until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”131
Professor Young made a similar point that Edmund Burke would
counsel following a clear, well-established later judicial tradition
elaborating the general concept used by the framers and ratifiers in
explicit constitutional text, even if it could be shown that the judicial
precedents conflicted with the framers’ and ratifiers’ original specific views.132 Regarding how precedent gets used, Professor Young
noted that Burke would agree with Madison that a “series of particular discussions and adjudications”133 carries interpretive weight beyond the impact of mere stare decisis.134 Professor Young stated,
When used as a means of divining the present meaning of a constitutional provision as it has evolved
over time, precedent itself functions as a tool of interpretation; rather than offering a reason to adhere
to an incorrect interpretation under the doctrine of
stare decisis, the force of precedent enters into the
initial determination of what the correct interpretation is.135
In his writing, Professor Dworkin has called this use the “gravitational force” of precedent, which is distinct to a precedent’s “enactment force.”136 In Dworkin’s terminology, the “enactment force”
of a precedent focuses on the narrow question of whether to follow
an incorrect interpretation under the doctrine of stare decisis based

131

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 91, at 229 (James Madison).
See Young, supra note 87, at 664–65. In contrast, at least one standard
originalist commentator has disagreed with this understanding of a Burkean approach, and has counseled Burkean judges to follow text rather than precedent,
both on original meaning grounds and because such an approach, in the author’s
view, best reflects American judicial traditions. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV.
635, 636–37 (2006).
133
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 91, at 229 (James Madison).
134
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 367.
135
Young, supra note 87, at 691–92 (emphasis in original).
136
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977).
132
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upon practical reasons.137 Some of these practical reasons are “convenience, reliance on accumulated experience, and the usefulness
for planning of being able to predict what a court will decide.”138
The “gravitational force” of a precedent, however, arises from “the
fairness of treating like cases alike.”139 Thus, the “gravitational
force” of a precedent “may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments,” but to fairness.140
This view of “reasoned elaboration” of the law, where the reasoning of prior cases exerts an influence on what the doctrine means
today, independent of the “enactment force” of the precedent’s core
holding, is, according to Professor Dworkin, a “distinctive fact about
common law adjudication.”141 More generally, it is a distinctive fact
about constitutional law adjudication when in a common-law mode,
as for interpretation of broad concepts placed into the Constitution,
where there is a “good deal of the common law type of reasoning in
the constitutional cases,”142 based on the view that the framers and
ratifiers intended “the answers develop over time in a common-law
fashion.”143
137
See Ronald Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (1977) (responding to Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L.
REV. 991, 1008 (1977)).
138
Id. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1176–84 (2006) (discussing the benefits of stare decisis
and “bedrock precedents”).
139
Dworkin, supra note 137, at 1230 (quoted in Greenawalt, supra note 137,
at 1008).
140
Id. at 1231.
141
Id. at 1230.
142
Edward H. Levi, The Sovereignty of the Courts, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 679,
695 (1983).
143
DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 79 (1993). On such
common-law constitutionalism, see Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221, 265–72 (1973). Because they were immersed in the Anglo-American system
of judicial decisionmaking, the framers’ and ratifiers’ views were grounded in the
grand traditions of the Anglo-American common law system. This approach favors principles such as reasoned elaboration of the law, fidelity to precedent, deciding cases on narrower grounds where possible, and deciding most cases only
after full briefing and argument. See Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common
Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 450–63 (1975); Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason
of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (1981); Church
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The principle of “reasoned elaboration” includes clearly defined
tests that work in practice, coherence and consistency in legal categories, and avoidance of functional balancing tests that are situationspecific and not easily reconcilable with other aspects of legal doctrine, unless contemporaneous sources and subsequent events mandate use of such tests.144 These notions are implicit in the factors
stated in Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter’s joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for determining when a judge should
find the impetus to overrule precedent: (1) it is unworkable in practice; (2) it creates an inconsistency or incoherence in the law; (3) a
changed understanding of facts has undermined its factual basis; (4)
it represents a substantially wrong or substantially unjust interpretation of the Constitution; or (5) it raises concerns about a “commitment to the rule of law.”145 The Court has subsequently added
whether the decision was “well-reasoned” to factor (4)’s concern

of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 571–76 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing deciding cases on narrower grounds, the importance of full briefing and argument, and
reasoned and consistent elaboration of the law). Deciding cases on narrower, factspecific grounds, has been called “judicial minimalism” by Professor Sunstein.
He has noted that such “minimalism” is most useful in giving “flexibility to politically accountable officials . . . in difficult cases at the frontiers of constitutional
law [where] judges would do best to avoid firm rules that they might come to
regret.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899,
1899, 1907–15 (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3–6 (1999).
144
Reasoned elaboration of the law would also include, in some version, commitment to developing the law according to “neutral principles.” On “neutral principles,” see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of
Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 982 (1978). For a critique of the possibility of developing the law according to neutral principles, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1983).
145
505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992). For discussion of these factors for overruling
a precedent, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 4.3, 7.3.3–7.3.4, at 84–89,
209–28. The Supreme Court has also discussed these same factors in the context
of statutory interpretation. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295–96
(1996); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989). Indeed,
the Court has noted the even greater force of precedent in statutory construction
because of the easier resort to amendment in such cases to correct faulty interpretation. Id. at 172–73, 175 n.1.
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with a “substantially wrong” or “substantially unjust” interpretation
as a reason to overrule precedent.146
Absent the “gravitational force” of precedents, one might adopt
the view, stated by Justice Scalia, that a precedent should be overturned if that precedent is wrongly decided, unless the precedent
represents settled law147 or, as stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
precedent has engendered substantial reliance.148 For natural law
judges, a precedent should not be overruled, even if it is not settled
law, or there has been no substantial reliance on it, unless one or
more of the factors discussed above counsels for it to be overruled.149
D.

The Lack of Historical Evidence for the Static Approach to
Constitutional Interpretation
Since the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified, positivism, as a counterpoint to natural law theory, has become an accepted
dichotomy in legal theory.150 However, positivism was not any major part of the backdrop of eighteenth century legal theory. One of

146

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (discussing
whether decision is “well reasoned” as part of whether it is substantially wrong
and deserves overruling) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93
(2009)).
147
See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court is Dealing with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 990–95
(1996) (“Justices should do what is legally right by asking two questions: (1) Was
Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law?
If the answer to both questions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled.”)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As Justice Scalia noted, considering precedents
after a constitutional provision is ratified is inconsistent with a pure static approach to constitutional interpretation, and thus “stare decisis is not part of my
originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.” SCALIA, supra note 5, at
140 (emphasis in original).
148
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 233 (1995). See also
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 147, at 993–95 (discussing the differences between
Holmesian and natural law judges when considering overruling precedents).
149
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 147, at 995–96. The factors counseling
overruling of precedent are discussed supra text accompanying notes 144–46.
150
See Frederick Schauer, The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, 101 VA.
L. REV. 957, 974 (2015).
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the first modern spokesmen for positivism was Jeremy Bentham,151
who was only twenty-eight years old when the Declaration of Independence was drafted, yet noted in a pamphlet his view that the natural law rhetoric in the founding document was “nonsense upon
stilts”152—indicating how far his view was from the dominant opinion of the framing and ratifying generation. Even with respect to
English law, during his lifetime, Bentham was a known critic of the
existing ways of thinking about the law.153 The emergence of Bentham’s positivism as a counterpoint to natural law really began in
1832 when Englishman John Austin published his positivist manifesto, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.154
One can find increasing discussion and acceptance of Bentham’s
and Austin’s ideas in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century in common law, statutory interpretation, and constitutional law.155 Positivism has continued as a major force in legal
jurisprudential thinking, particularly in the form of H.L.A. Hart’s
concept that each society has a positive “rule of recognition” that
defines which acts count as valid legal enactments.156 The emergence of positivism can lead to a more fixed or static view of constitutional interpretation, as it is consistent with positivism to view
the task of the framers and ratifiers as placing their fixed preferences
151

Id. at 960 (“[T]he individual most associated with the origins of legal positivism in the modern and analytic jurisprudential tradition is Jeremy Bentham.”).
152
Kevin F. Ryan, We Hold These Truths, 31 VT. B.J. 9, 12 (2005) (citing
Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in
BENTHAM’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973) (“[n]atural
rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,
nonsense upon stilts”).
153
See Schauer, supra note 150, at 961 (“The connection between Bentham’s
contempt for the English legal system of the late eighteenth century and his adoption of what we now think of as a positivist perspective is not difficult to discern.
Bentham was, above all, a reformer.”) (footnote omitted).
154
See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London, John Murray 1832). On nineteenth century “positivism” generally, see
AUGUSTE COMTE, A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 1 (J. H. Bridges trans., Trübner and Co. 1865) (1848).
155
See generally GILMORE, supra note 47, at 11–13 (discussing a pre-Civil
War “Golden Age” and a post-Civil War to World War I “formalist” or “conceptualist” age); HALL, supra note 70, at 211 (“From the Civil War to about 1900 the
trend favored the formalistic and conservative judicial approach . . . .”).
156
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–120 (1961). See also JOSEPH RAZ,
THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 197–200 (2d ed. 1980).
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into the Constitution.157 The more “analytic” version of positivism,
reflected in the formalist interpretation theory of Justice Scalia, was
most dominant on the United States Supreme Court from 1873 to
1937, while the more “functional” version of positivism, represented
by the interpretation theory of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, came
to prominence on the Court from 1937 to 1954.158
It is important to note that even from a positivist jurisprudential
perspective, a judge would properly engage in the natural law style
of judicial interpretation if the judge concluded that our framers’ and
ratifiers’ “rule of recognition” was to interpret the Constitution in
such a manner.159 In any event, during the framing and ratifying period for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Civil War
amendments, natural law was the dominant background theory, and
that approach to interpretation was adopted by early and continuous
Supreme Court practice, as discussed above.160 Only a few individuals at the time, including Thomas Jefferson, adopted arguments
that viewed “constitutional propositions [as] deductions from static
principles,” from which “no argument from subsequent precedent,
practice, or experience could change [its] conclusion.”161
157

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40–41 nn.20–22, 278–302 (discussing “Formalist Constitutional Interpretation”).
158
See id. at 405–24.
159
See Schauer, supra note 19, at 802–03 (“[T]he act of constitutional interpretation in the United States may require every bit as much moral inspection as
would be required by the most morally thick of natural law theories. The difference would be only that the tradition of positivism would see this as a contingent
feature of modern American constitutionalism, capable of being different at other
times or in other systems, while the natural law tradition would see this as an
instance of a conceptual truth equally applicable to all existing and possible legal
systems.”).
160
See supra text accompanying notes 72–88 (natural law theory); 89–149
(judicial practice).
161
POWELL, supra note 77, at 92, 95. A few other Jeffersonian Republicans
also adopted such views, particularly after 1800. See POWELL, supra note 77, at
92, 110 (citing, inter alia, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES
(1803) (Appendix on Tucker’s views on how to interpret the United States Constitution)). However, Tucker’s views, and those of some other Jeffersonian Republicans, that strict interpretation was intended by the framers and ratifiers must
be understood against a backdrop of their contention that the States ratified the
Constitution. They used that assertion to advance constitutional interpretation in
favor of states’ rights. Id. at 109–10. Undermining that historical case for such
states’ rights argumentation, Chief Justice Marshall reminded such states’ rights
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Further, even Thomas Jefferson’s more formalist theory of interpretation must be considered against a backdrop of his view that,
since “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living,” each new generation has the right to make for itself a new Constitution.162 Under
such a view, the Constitution would not be intended to endure for
ages, but only until the next Constitution was adopted.163 A static
model of interpretation makes better sense in such circumstances,
for needed flexibility can come from newly-adopted constitutional
language.164 Jefferson supported such a static model as he phrased
the point,
on every question of construction, [we] carry ourselves back to the time when the Constitution was
adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be
squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed.165
Thus, for initiatives that Jefferson supported, but which were of
questionable constitutionality under his model of interpretation, like
use of federal monies for internal improvements, Jefferson “felt that
amendment of the Constitution” was proper.166
advocates in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–06 (1819),
that the framers rejected existing state legislature ratification of the Constitution,
which had occurred for the Articles of Confederation, and instead “the instrument
was submitted to the people” (“We, the People”) voting in special state ratifying
conventions. Given their willingness to make false historical assertions regarding
ratification to advance a states’ rights agenda, one can wonder whether their assertions regarding historical support for strict constitutional interpretation, which
was also used to limit federal power and advance a states’ rights agenda, was
similarly based on an inaccurate account of historical intent.
162
DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 302 (Kermit Hall & David O’Brien eds., 1994) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788–1792, at 116 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895) [hereinafter
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON].
163
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 178.
164
See id.
165
MAYER, supra note 162, at 285.
166
Id. at 218–19. Even concerning the Louisiana Purchase, which was a very
popular action, Jefferson preferred a constitutional amendment to ratify the purchase. As stated by Professor Mayer,
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Despite Jefferson’s support, the view of constantly, newlyadopted constitutions was rejected by the framing and ratifying generation, including James Madison, for whom “too frequent appeals
to the people to ‘new-model’ government would, ‘in great measure
deprive, the government of that veneration which time bestows on
everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.’”167 Unlike the detailed Constitutional Codes that emerged during the nineteenth century in civil-law systems,168 the United States Constitution was not
intended to be such a document.169 Imposing a style of interpretation
that fits better with documents drafted as a code, like formalism’s
focus on literal text, would be inconsistent with how the Constitution was drafted.170 Similarly, requiring constitutional amendment
for every evolutionary change in understanding of a natural law concept placed into the Constitution would be inconsistent with how the
framers and ratifiers would have expected the constitutional amendment process to work.171 Of course, differences in the purpose of a
document and the ease of amendment counsel for different balances

Although he eventually acquiesced in the Louisiana Purchase
without the constitutional amendment that he believed was necessary to sanction it, what is noteworthy is the degree to which
he agonized over what may be fairly regarded as a technical
question. Indeed, he was willing to jeopardize the acquisition of
Louisiana, despite its immense strategic importance, in order to
save the principle of strict construction.
Id. at 215.
167
Id. at 301 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 91, at 314 (James
Madison).
168
See Nuno Garoupa & Andrew P. Morriss, The Fable of the Codes: The
Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Movements, 2012
U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1445 n.7 (“By 1868, the Napoleonic Code or codes related
to it, governed ‘two-thirds of the civilized world.’”) (citation omitted).
169
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 178.
170
See id. For discussion of a constitution that was drafted with formalist presuppositions more in mind, see infra text accompanying notes 205–06 (the Texas
Constitution of 1876).
171
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 178. See also supra text accompanying notes 111–16; infra text accompanying notes 200–03.
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when dealing with the interpretation of statutes or treaties––a topic
outside the focus of this Article.172
IV.

NON-ORIGINALIST ARGUMENTS FOR VARIOUS VERSIONS OF
ORIGINAL MEANING
To the extent that standard originalism cannot be defended as
reflecting the actual historical intent of the framers and ratifiers, a
non-originalist argument needs to be advanced to support that kind
of interpretation. Under non-originalist approaches, the judge or
commentator has to decide what principles of justice or sound social
policy should be advanced.173 With regard to principles of justice,
should it be, as Justice Scalia once remarked, “the philosophy of
Hume, or of John Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill, or of Aristotle?”174
There are four basic non-originalist approaches: (1) a “consequentialist” approach, which looks to the jurist’s own view as to the
best theory to yield the best consequences for society;175 (2) a “current consensus” or “current majority” or “Dworkian” approach,
which looks to what theory of interpretation is best reflected in existing doctrine;176 (3) a “progressive historicist” approach, which
looks to what theory of interpretation is most likely to be reflected
in the future, or what the “community eventually will hold,” if that
can be determined;177 and (4) a “pluralist” model of interpretation

172
For brief discussion of these issues in the context of eighteenth-century
thought about interpretation of statutes or treaties, see infra note 206 and accompanying text.
173
See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 46.
174
Id. at 45.
175
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 57, at 16–22, 43–52 (discussing a “judge’s own
values” approach).
176
See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 6 (2006) (“Constitutional constructivism draws our
principles and rights from our constitutional democracy’s ongoing practice, tradition, and culture.”) (footnote omitted); DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 225, 400 (interpretation according to the best political theory that explains the current legal
order); Wellington, supra note 143, at 284–97 (community consensus model of
interpretation).
177
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 56, at 444 (“On this issue, the death penalty,
I hope to embody a community, although perhaps not yet arrived, striving for human dignity for all.”).
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reflecting some unspecified combination of original intent, consequentialist, current majority, and progressive historicist reasoning.178 Each will be discussed in turn.
A.

Arguments For and Against a Static Version of Original
Meaning on Consequentialist Grounds
A consequentialist approach could end up supporting static constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Randy Barnett has
argued for standard originalism on consequentialist grounds, independent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent.179 Specifically, he has
argued that “the impetus for an original meaning method of interpretation” is suggested by the parol evidence rule.180 By such parallel, Professor Barnett has supported a static original meaning constitutional interpretation to “fulfill” the “evidentiary, cautionary,
channeling, and clarification functions” of reducing agreements to
writing.181 As Professor Barnett notes, although doctrines like “the
statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and the objective theory of
contract interpretation” have been “attacked by law professors as
backwards and formalist, they remain with us today,” and because
the “Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers,” it is
important to “lock in” its meaning and not have such language
evolve over time.182
Justice Scalia similarly expressed a preference for static constitutional interpretation based, in part, on his view of the anti-evolutionary nature of a constitution.183 He also supported it on grounds
that such an approach tends to make constitutional interpretation
more predictable,184 and on grounds of promoting judicial restraint.185 He also noted that in his view, “evolving standards [do not
always] mark progress,” since societies do not “always mature, as
opposed to rot.”186
178

See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation,
72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1994).
179
BARNETT, supra note 14, at 91, 102–19.
180
Id. at 102.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 103–05.
183
See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 44–45.
184
See generally Scalia, supra note 33, at 1179.
185
See id. at 1179–80.
186
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 40–41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Taking these arguments together, there seems to be four reasons
to support static constitutional interpretation: (1) anti-evolutionary
nature of a constitution; (2) judicial restraint; (3) consistency with
the written nature of a constitution; and (4) predictability. Each will
be considered in turn.
1.

ANTI-EVOLUTIONARY NATURE VERSUS ANTIMAJORITARIAN NATURE OF A CONSTITUTION
The anti-evolutionary argument for static interpretation makes
most sense when dealing with structural issues of separation of powers and federalism. From an original intent perspective, the framers
were concerned about limiting government power and ensuring no
tyranny by one branch over another.187 The framers did not commit
to a rigid, formalist approach to separation of powers, and in practice, functionalism should be considered.188 However, the words
used in the Constitution are reasonably detailed and specific regarding congressional and Presidential powers,189 and, in deciding cases,
the Court has emphasized text over legislative/executive practice.190
187
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.1, at 771–73. As Madison noted,
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
supra note 91, at 322 (James Madison).
188
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.1, at 771–73; R. Randall Kelso,
Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 531, 564–72
(1993), and sources cited therein; Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1254–55 (1988); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions
– A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–96 (1987).
189
See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II. Of course, even with respect to such specific
language, this does not commit even a formalist interpreter to dictionary literalism, but reading words in light of context. See John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 107–15 (2001) (discussing textualism, literalism, and both statutory purpose and context).
190
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–51, 959 (1983) (legislative
veto provision unconstitutional, as it conflicts Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses, despite legislative and executive practice of its use in almost 300 statutory provisions since 1932 through 1975); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 436–41 (1998) (unconstitutional to give President a line-item veto power,
based on text of Presidential Veto power being limited to “Bills,” not line items
in bills, despite legislative/executive support in passing the Line-Item Veto Act of
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On the other hand, regarding individual rights provisions in the
Constitution, it is clear from the natural law perspective of the framing and ratifying generation that the critical purpose of the Constitution was not to be “anti-evolutionary,” but rather to be “anti-majoritarian.”191 The point of natural law provisions involving individual rights was to remove certain decisions from the majoritarian
democratic process based on the natural rights that individuals have
to be free from majoritarian prejudices.192 As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky has noted:
[T]he framers openly and explicitly distrusted majority rule; virtually every government institution they
created had strong anti-majoritarian features. Even
more importantly, the Constitution exists primarily
to shield some matters from easy change by political
majorities. The body of the Constitution reflects a
commitment to separation of powers and individual
liberties (for example, no ex post facto laws or bills
of attainder, no state impairment of the obligation of
contracts, no congressional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus except in times of insurrection). Furthermore, as Justice Jackson eloquently stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to

1996). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.4, at 793–811 (discussing
“Legislative Power over National Policy”).
191
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term – Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 74–75 (1989).
192
See id.
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vote: they depend on the outcome of no elections.193
2.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT VERSUS JUDICIAL ROLE IN
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
From the perspective of our natural law tradition, the protection
of individual rights to liberty and equality are paramount.194 As our
Declaration of Independence states, “to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed . . . .”195 Thus, a pluralistic democratic society is viewed not as an end in itself, but rather, as the best means
by which to ensure that society protects and advances that natural
law set of rights. From that perspective, it would be counterproductive to engage in a static model of interpretation, since that model
would allow for moral progress only when the democratic majority
decided to adopt the more enlightened interpretation of the natural
law principle. Yet, the whole point of enacting that constitutional
provision was to remove the decision from democratic decisionmaking.
For example, when judges adopted post-1954 more enlightened
interpretations of equal protection and due process to create advances in race relation cases, gender discrimination cases, and cases
involving sexual orientation, they have acted consistent with a natural law understanding of those concepts.196 For the Court to have
sat on the sidelines and hoped for the legislative and executive processes alone to deal with those matters would have been a betrayal
of what those natural law principles promote. For the most part, the
Court did sit on the sidelines from the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 until 1954, with little moral progress
193

Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
194
See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 72, at 3–23, 313–15, 361–83 (discussing influences of natural law on the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction amendments, including the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
195
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
196
On the race, gender, and sexual orientation cases generally during the twentieth century, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2062, 2064 (2002).
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made. The major exception was women’s suffrage in 1920, which
was the product of an enormous and sustained social movement, and
not equaled with respect to the failed Equal Rights Amendment of
1972.197
Admittedly, from the positivist perspective of formalism, such a
view of judicial review raises counter-majoritarian difficulties, as
discussed in the famous book by Professor Alexander Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch, in 1962.198 The counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review can still be a “central obsession of modern
constitutional scholarship,” unless judicial review is linked to aiding
participatory governance.199 Interpreting constitutional provisions
in the natural law manner in which they were drafted aids in the
participatory governance model of a constitutional republic adopted
by the framers and ratifiers for our governance.
3.

CONSTITUTION AS CONTRACT VERSUS CONSTITUTION AS A
CONSTITUTION
Our Constitution was not drafted with Antonin Scalia’s or
Randy Barnett’s presumptions about constitutional interpretation in
mind. It has been noted that “[t]he federal constitution is a product
of the Enlightenment. It manifests a qualified optimism about the
power of government to improve society . . . . The powers delegated
to all three branches of the federal government can grow to meet

197
See Thomas E. Baker, Towards a “More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts
on Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 13–15, 18 (2000) (“According to the account of one of the historic champions of the Nineteenth Amendment, the effort to guarantee women the franchise took 72 years and included 56
state-referenda campaigns, 480 state-legislative campaigns, 47 state-constitutional conventions, 277 state-party conventions, 30 national-party conventions,
and 19 campaigns before 19 successive Congresses—just to get the measure before the states for ratification.”) (citation omitted).
198
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. 1986).
199
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334–36 (1998).
For recent discussion of this issue, see Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMM. 61, 62–64 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E.
BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE).

162

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:112

future needs.”200 On the assumption that the document would be interpreted in light of a natural law style of interpretation, which
would permit such growth in light of purpose, legislative and executive practice, and precedential arguments, drafting a formal amendment process that is relatively difficult makes sense.
From a static, fixed interpretation perspective, particularly one
focused heavily on literal textual meaning, the Constitution would
need to be much longer and more detailed, partaking, as Chief Justice Marshall warned in McCulloch v. Maryland, “of the prolixity of
a legal code.”201 Provisions for formal amendment would likely be
drafted to be easier, since formal amendment would be the primary
means of adjusting the Constitution to new realities. For example,
the Texas Constitution, drafted in 1876, and reflective of a formalist
style of interpretation, is long and detailed; it contains over 80,000
words, and thus is eight times longer than the United States Constitution.202 As Professor Harold Bruff, of the University of Texas
School of Law, has noted,
Designed for a largely rural, agrarian state with less
than a million inhabitants and no oil industry, the
Texas Constitution has endured to govern [a] largely
urban and industrialized state only because it is relatively easy to amend . . . [while] encrusted with 326
amendments [as of 1990, and 491 as of 2015].203
From this perspective, to encrust a formalist, static model of interpretation, requiring greater resort to the formal amendment process onto a document, like the United States Constitution, whose
amendment provisions were not drafted with a formalist model of
200

Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1990) (footnote omitted).
201
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
202
See JANICE C. MAY, THE TEXAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE, at xxxv–xxxvi (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
203
Bruff, supra note 200, at 1339 (footnote omitted). “To amend the Texas
Constitution, the amendment must be proposed by a joint resolution of the legislature, must receive a two-thirds vote in each house, and must carry a simple majority of the voters at an election.” Id. n.16. See generally RESEARCH DIV. OF THE
TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION SINCE 1867,
at 1 (2016), available at http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/docs/amendments/Constamend1876.pdf.
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interpretation in mind, frustrates both the intent of the framers and
ratifiers and makes little practical sense in terms of consequentialist
arguments.
As was discussed earlier,204 part of Randy Barnett’s analysis to
support static constitutional interpretation is that a constitution is
like a contract. However, unlike constitutions, contracts tend to be
short-term documents, focused on defining rights to a discrete transaction, and contracts are relatively easy to amend.205 As was discussed earlier, Jefferson solved the problem of static interpretation
and needed amendments by saying that society should make a new
constitution each generation, but that was understandably not
thought at the time, nor today, to be a good idea.206
204

See supra text accompanying notes 181–82; BARNETT, supra note 14, at
102–03.
205
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(amendment valid even without consideration if it proposes a fair deal in light of
unforeseen circumstances); U.C.C. § 2-209 (AM. LAW INST. 2014-2015) (in sale
of goods cases amendment is valid even without consideration if done in good
faith). More flexible interpretation is often built in to longer-term “relational” contracts through concepts like “good faith” or “best efforts” requirements of performance). See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1089–95, 1111, 1136–39 (1981). And, even in standard, simple, non-relational contracts, if words are so general as to be ambiguous,
resort is made to material outside a static view of interpretation, such as “course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §§ 202–03; U.C.C. § 2-208. A similar observation can be made
about treaty interpretation, even from an eighteenth-century perspective. See Tutt,
supra note 72, at 308 (“If the text was not clear, the next step was to look at [] the
common usage of the terms together, then their reasonable import, then finally, if
necessary, context, subject matter, consequences, and purposes.”).
206
See supra text accompanying notes 162–68. Treatises are typically intended to be less evolutionary than Constitutions, and are more like contracts,
although they are still different. As has been noted, “[T]reaties differ[] from compacts and agreements by virtue of their weightiness, their duration, their tendency
to involve multiple interlocking instruments, and their ability to bind the whole
nation.” Tutt, supra note 72, at 354.
For statutory interpretation, statutes are easier to amend than the Constitution, although harder than contracts. In addition, evolution in statutory guidelines
often comes today through deference by Congress to agencies to develop rules
and regulations, and Court deference to an agency’s reasonable construction of its
statutory mandate, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984), as well as Court deference to an agency’s own interpretation of its regulation, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997). His-
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4.

STATIC VERSUS LIVING ORIGINAL MEANING IN TERMS OF
PREDICTABILITY
While it is often claimed that a static view of interpretation leads
to more predictable results than does a living model of constitutional
interpretation, an evolving, living Constitution based on later legislative, executive, and social practice, and judicial precedents is not
necessarily less predictable than a static or fixed Constitution, particularly for the plethora of broad terms used in the Constitution.207
torically, standard originalists supported Chevron and Auer deference. See Manning, supra note 189, at 107–08 (“[A]n important facet of the textualist conception
of legislative supremacy acknowledges congressional latitude to delegate lawelaboration authority to agencies and courts. Hence, Congress can opt for more
flexible, purposive interpretation simply by enacting standards rather than rules.”)
(footnote omitted). Recently, some standard originalists have raised concerns
about the Chevron and Auer doctrines, in part because these doctrines permit
agencies to make law by modernizing interpretation of statutes in light of contemporary policies, not original intent. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (citing concerns by himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
Regarding statutory interpretation generally, from a natural law perspective the purpose of statute is critical, not mere literalism. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text; Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (KB) (judges
should inquire into the “mischief and defect” that the drafter was seeking to remedy and should “make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance
of the mischief . . . .”). This permits departure from strict literal interpretation. In
addition, there is a debate about how much this focus on purpose can be used to
advance statutory interpretation in light of the “way of equity” of the statute. Warren Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 489, 493–
505 (discussing the use by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Plowden of “practical wisdom”
and following the “way of equity” of the statute). For a back-and-forth on how
much courts and commentators in the founding era adopted textualist versus equity of the statute interpretation, compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About
Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 991–98 (2001) (courts and commentators somewhat willing to resort to equitable interpretation) with John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648–53 (2001). See also Manning, supra note 189, at 53–
55, 108–15 (courts and commentators more skeptical and concerned about “equitable interpretation”).
207
See generally Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226,
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For instance, regarding the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to same-sex marriage, Justice Scalia noted
in United States v. Windsor that while his position against recognizing such a right was predictable given his static theory of constitutional interpretation, it was equally predictable from their living theory of interpretation that Justice Kennedy and the majority would
take the opposite view when the case came before the Court.208 That
prediction was borne out two years later in Obergefell v. Hodges.209
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the contours of Justice Scalia’s
conclusion for the Court that the Second Amendment includes an
individual right to own firearms was made more predictable, not
less, by his recitation of the legislative, executive, and social practice regarding the Amendment’s rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and by his discussion of judicial precedents.210
In terms of predictability generally, the predictable result of a
static, formalist approach to constitutional interpretation is to support locking in the values of an earlier generation.211 For our society,
and those of Europe, those values are predisposed toward white,
propertied, straight men holding traditional patriarchal views. As
one author has noted,
Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to strike
down federal affirmative action provisions, state affirmative action plans, measures designed to promote
minority ownership of media, campaign finance legislation that attempts to redress wealth inequities in
the political process, portions of the Americans with
236–59 (1988) (discussion of the problem of ambiguity in constitutional interpretation). For traditional critiques of latent ambiguity in every act of interpretation,
see David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 136–57, 164–76 (1985).
208
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage
is indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion.”) (emphasis in original).
209
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015).
210
Compare 554 U.S. 570, 576–605 (2008) (discussing arguments of text,
context, and history of the Second Amendment in the 18th century) with id. at 605–
28 (discussing arguments of legislative, executive, and social practice, and judicial precedents, regarding the Second Amendment after its ratification).
211
See supra text accompanying notes 179–82 (discussing Professor Barnett’s
“lock in” rationale to constitutional interpretation).
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Disabilities Act, part of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, legislative attempts to promote minority
representation, laws protecting women from violence, and laws protecting gays, the aged, and the disabled from discrimination. They have found constitutional violations in the actions of local communities seeking to protect their citizens from flooding,
congestion, and environmental damage. They have
even argued that the efforts of all fifty states to fund
legal services for the poor by using the interest from
a pooled account of lawyers’ trust funds which could
not earn interest for their owners, was nevertheless
an unconstitutional taking even though the owners
suffered no economic loss.212
Given this reality, it is perhaps no coincidence that the strongest
supporters of static, formalist interpretation in the United States tend
to be white, propertied, straight men (and those who support or rely
on them for support).213
At a general philosophical level, there are two main camps regarding the basic content of natural rights to liberty: (1) individual
liberty includes the liberty to try to exploit others versus (2) individual liberty supports the rights of each individual equally to reach
their full potential free from exploitation by others.214 Liberty as a
liberty to try to exploit others reflects the political philosophies of
writers like Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ayn Rand, and
Robert Nozick.215

212

William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nomination Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
819, 827–28 (2005).
213
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservativism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 5, 20–22 (2011) (noting that the strongest supporters of static, formalist
interpretation tend to be those with traditional conservative political ideologies).
214
See Kelso, supra note 82, at 434 (“Some moral philosophers have taken
the position that egotism or self-interest is rational, and therefore good and just,
and have built their moral systems on a foundational principle of self-interest . . . .
Most moral philosophers, however, reject this view.”).
215
See id. at 434 n.2 (“[Hobbes’] argument is concerned to persuade people
to institute and maintain a sovereign. Given Hobbes’ psychological theory, people
will do this only if they believe it is in their self-interest. Hence, self-interest is all
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In contrast, most writers on natural rights to liberty affirm the
principle that moral behavior is not self-centered —from more secular philosophers like John Locke,216 David Hume,217 Adam

that can yield obedience to the laws of nature and political obedience to the sovereign.”) (quoting 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 775 (Becker & Becker eds., 2d ed.
2001)); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN xxiv–xxxiv (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1651); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 906 (Becker & Becker
eds., 1992) (“The morality of an abundant, creative, and egoistic power that Nietzsche describes as the origin of human evolution ultimately becomes the norm of
his own ethics.”); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 152–53 (Marion Faber, ed. & trans., 1998); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
302 (1974) (“The model is designed to let you choose what you will, with the sole
constraint being that others may do the same for themselves and refuse to stay in
the world you have imagined.”); AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 480–81 (1957)
(during the trial of Hank Rearden, the defendant refuses to apologize for selfish
pursuits of profit and power).
216
See Ryan, supra note 152, at 12 (“Natural rights theory, especially in its
Lockean version, assumes that people have moral obligations independent of, or
prior to, the formation of society or government, and that those obligations are
best viewed as the requirement to respect the rights of others to life, liberty, and
property.”) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 135, at
82–83 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690)).
217
See, e.g., WILLS, supra note 79, at 193–201 (“moral sense,” not rational
self-interest, determines morality from the Scottish Enlightenment perspective;
discussing, inter alia, David Hume’s 1751 book, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals).
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Smith,218 Immanuel Kant,219 John Rawls,220 and Ronald
Dworkin;221 to philosophers more associated with religious traditions, such as that of John Finnis222 or Robert George;223 or to main-

218

In Adam Smith’s view,
[T]o the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss
or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of
vastly more importance . . . than the greatest concern of another
with whom we have no particular [connection] . . . . Before we
can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we
must change our position. We must view them, neither from our
own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet
with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person,
who has no particular [connection] with either, and who judges
with impartiality between us . . . . When the happiness or misery
of others depends in any respect upon our conduct, we dare not,
as self-love might suggest to us, prefer the interest of one to that
of many. The man within immediately calls to us, that we value
ourselves too much and other people too little, and that, by doing so, we render ourselves the proper object of the contempt
and indignation of our brethren.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 135–38 (D.D. Raphael &
A.L. Macfie, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759).
219
Immanuel Kant’s view that reason compels an individual to “[a]ct only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law” and for everyone to treat “all maxims of actions never
merely as means, but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means,
i.e., always at the same time as end,” rejects egotism, and thus is in direct contrast
to Nietzsche’s egocentricism. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37, 56 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press
2002) (1795). See also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 666 (Becker & Becker eds.,
1992) (“This leads Kant to a new formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act
always so that you treat humanity, in your own person or another, never merely
as a means but also at the same time as an end in itself.’”) (quoting IMMANUEL
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785)).
220
John Rawls’ principle that justice derives from individuals agreeing on
rules from an “original position” where no individual will be favored rejects
Nozick’s egocentric approach. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–22
(1971).
221
Ronald Dworkin’s principle of “equal concern and respect” for others,
based upon his view of the best interpretation of the existing moral principles of
Western industrialized societies, represents a rejection of the morality of egoism.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977) (“Government
must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and
respect.”).
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stream religious traditions, including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism224—and in various ways affirm as moral
222

John Finnis’ account of basic human goods, like knowledge and friendship,
leads to a rejection of egotism in favor of loving one’s neighbor as part of the ideal
of “integral human fulfillment.” John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning,
38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (defining “integral human fulfillment” as “the
ideal of the instantiation of all the basic human goods in all human persons and
communities”).
223
See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
PUBLIC MORALITY 28–47, 219–28 (1993). Professor George modifies Aquinas’
approach to better account for principles of religious liberty, see id. at 41–42,
while grounding morality in the non-egocentric advancement of the “common
good.” Id. at 29. As Professor George noted,
Human beings put their lives together in different ways by making different choices and commitments based on different values that provide different reasons for choice and action. There
is no single pattern anyone can identify as the proper model of
a human life, not because there is no such thing as good and
bad, but because there are many goods.
Id. at 38–39.
224
See Mark 12:31 (King James) (“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”); ISSAC HERZOG, 1 THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 386 (2d ed.
1965) (“[B]ring the law as much as possible into line with the highest ethical
norms, already presided over the growth and development of Jewish law, . . .
[which] commanded ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’ and ‘Love the stranger as
thyself.’ (Leviticus xix, 19, and 33–34).”); Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar
and Jurist: The Controversy Over the Research of Jewish Law Using Comparative Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L. & REL. 189, 208 (2007); Zainah Anwar & Jana S. Rumminger, Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws:
Challenges, Possibilities, and Strategies for Reform, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1529, 1541 (2007) (discussing “the recognition of equality between men and
women in Islam, the imperative of ijtihad (independent reasoning to arrive at a
legal principle) in modern times, [and] the dynamics between what is universal
for all times and what is particular to seventh century Arabia”); Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, What is Islamic Law?, 57 MERCER L. REV. 595, 600–603 (2006) (“Islamic Law, called Sharia, starts off from these two commandments” – “Love of
God” and “Love of Neighbor”); R. Mary Hayden Lemmons, Tolerance, Society,
and the First Amendment: Reconsiderations, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 75, 89 (2005)
(“Hinduism: ‘One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious
to one’s own self’; and Buddhism: ‘Hurt not others in ways that you yourself
would find hurtful.’”) (quoting JEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RULE 192 n.2
(1996).
From this perspective, the specific doctrinal statements made in the various religious texts can all be understood as derivations from this basic point. For example,
as Pope John Paul II noted in his encyclical, Veritatis Splendor, there is a direct
connection between the specific principles of morality stated in the Bible and the
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the basic principle of “love of neighbor as thyself.”225 It is this vision
of morality that animated the framing and ratifying generation, not
that of the morality of self-interest, and which underlies the supposed liberty right to try to exploit others for one’s own gain, as long
as they have equal rights to try to exploit you.226
general non-egocentric moral command of “love of neighbor as oneself.” He
stated:
[T]he commandments belonging to the so-called “second tablet” of the Decalogue, the summary . . . and foundation of which
is the commandment of love of neighbor: . . . In this commandment we find a precise expression of the singular dignity of the
human person, “the only creature that God has wanted for its
own sake.” The different commandments of the Decalogue are
really only so many reflections on the one commandment about
the good of the person, at the level of the many different goods
which characterize his identify as a spiritual and bodily being
in relationship with God
POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR: THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH para. 13
(1993).
225
See supra notes 216–24 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
this non-egocentric vision of morality from the perspective of modern views of
moral reasoning around the world, see Kelso, supra note 82, at 434–45.
226
As phrased in a recent article regarding natural rights at the Founding, “natural rights called for good government, not necessarily less government.” Jud
Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 85, 87 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE
(2016)). A similar thought is expressed in Lawrence B. Solum, Republican Constitutionalism, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 175, 205 (2017) (“virtue is required for liberty”) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2016)).
Note that even though Jefferson did not embrace the natural law model of interpretation, see supra text accompanying notes 161–68, he believed in a non-egotistic vision of morality. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers:
A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (“For Jefferson, the fundamental precepts of morality, which he believed were held in common in all religions, were captured by Jesus’ maxims, ‘Treat others as you would have them
treat you’ and ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself.’”) (quoting KERRY S. WALTERS,
RATIONAL INFIDELS: THE AMERICAN DEISTS 181 (1992)). While his life was
fraught with contradictions regarding slavery, see, e.g., Aaron Schwabach, Jefferson and Slavery, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 63, 63–64 (1997), including his initial
draft of the Declaration of Independence condemning slavery, which had to be
removed to satisfy the objections of the Southern states, see id. at 79, Jefferson
hoped eventually for a more just society free of exploitation of man by man. See
id. at 86. As he stated in a letter, “I have sworn upon the altar of god, eternal
hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.” Letter from
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B.

Arguments For and Against the Other Non-Originalist
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation
The three other kinds of non-originalist arguments regarding
constitutional interpretation are: (1) a “current consensus” or “current majority” or “Dworkian” approach, which looks to what theory
of interpretation is best reflected in existing doctrine; (2) a “progressive historicist” approach which looks to what theory of interpretation is most likely to be reflected in the future, or what the “community eventually will hold,” if that can be determined; or (3) a “pluralist” model of interpretation reflecting some unspecified combination of original intent, consequentialist, current majority, and progressive historicist reasoning.227 Each will be discussed in turn.
1.
CURRENT CONSENSUS APPROACH
A judge following a current consensus or current majority or
Dworkian theory of justification would need to ask what judicial decision-making style best reflects the current majority view.228 While
such an approach would most likely have adopted a traditional natural law model of interpretation between 1789 and 1873,229 a “current consensus” approach would have adopted a formalist style of
interpretation between 1873 and 1937; a Holmesian style of interpretation between 1937 and 1954; and an instrumentalist style of
interpretation between 1954 and 1986.230 Since 1986, no interpretation style has commanded a majority on the United States Supreme
Court, although the swing votes on the Court since 1986––Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter231––have reflected a version of natural law interpretation consistent with Ronald Dworkin’s concept of
Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), reprinted in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 162, at 460.
227
See supra text accompanying notes 176–78.
228
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 225, 400 (discussing interpretation
according to the best political theory that explains the current legal order); See
also Wellington, supra note 143, at 284–97 (community consensus model of interpretation).
229
See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
230
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 13.1–13.2, at 405–18.
231
See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court: The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637,
652–54, 657–71 (2002). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at § 16.3, nn.81–
83; § 16.4, nn.87–105.
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“equal concern and respect,” or Adam Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator.”232
One weakness of this mode of justification is that it cannot explain why the interpretive approach should ever change, or criticize
the interpretive approach of another era.233 For example, the Supreme Court’s approach to race discrimination changed from 1896,
when the Court focused on existing customs and traditions to determine the reasonableness of legislation requiring whites and nonwhites to ride in separate railway cars in Plessy v. Ferguson,234 to
1954, when the Court focused more on the reasoned demands of human dignity and not treating any individual as a second-class citizen
in Brown v. Board of Education.235 From a current majority theory
of justification, the Court could say after 1954 that race discrimination cases should follow Brown, but would have no grounds to reject
Plessy as inappropriate for 1896 if the Plessy doctrine was consistent
with majority legal doctrine then.236
2.
PROGRESSIVE HISTORICIST APPROACH
Under a progressive historicist theory of interpretation, the focus
of legal justification is on what theory of interpretation is most likely
to be reflected in the future.237 An approach based on cognitive and
moral developmental psychology suggests the views an enlightened
community “eventually will hold” will reflect a modern version of
natural law.238 The growing convergence among Western industrialized democracies for judicial review based upon a modern version
232
For citation to Ronald Dworkin’s concept of “equal concern and respect,”
see supra note 221 and accompanying text, and for citation to Adam Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator,” see supra note 218 and accompanying text.
233
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.2.1, at 274.
234
163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question
whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . . [and in] determining
the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people . . . .”).
235
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”).
236
For discussion of Plessy being consistent with majority legal doctrine in
1896, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 26.2.1.1.B, at 1106–09.
237
See id. at 274.
238
See id. § 15.4.1, at 483–88 nn.71–81.
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of natural law239 is consistent with this view of progressive historicist reasoning.
3.
PLURALIST APPROACH
Professor James Fallon has argued for his interpretation theory
on pluralist grounds.240 While such an approach has the strength of
being able to pick and choose among all the other kinds of interpretation approaches how much emphasis to give each in various circumstances,241 it has the weakness of not providing the judge with
any guidance other than the judge’s own internal balance.242 As John
Hart Ely famously remarked, it is likely to be adopted by a person
who is “envisioning a Court staffed by Justices who think as they
do.”243

239

See id. § 17.1.4, at 572 n.68 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and
Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 483–85 (2003) (“Modern
rights typically are phrased in terms of broad moral concepts—for example, the
right of human dignity was made the central organizing value in the German Constitution, and the prestige of that constitution, and of the German Constitutional
Court in implementing it, have made that ‘dignity clause’ particularly influential
for other constitutional regimes around the world.”). See also Kelso, supra note
82, at 441–54 (discussing modern moral reasoning and emerging trends in constitutional interpretation around the world); R. Randall Kelso, United States Standards of Review versus the International Standard of Proportionality: Convergence and Symmetry, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 498–504 (2013).
240
See FALLON, supra note 21, at 5. See also Fallon, supra note 6, at 1252–68
(discussing five categories of constitutional law arguments – text, historical intent,
theory, precedent, and value – and refusing to pick any particular interpretation
theory as presumptively valid). For discussion of other pluralist/pragmatic approaches to constitutional interpretation, see Griffin, supra note 178; Posner, supra note 53; Farber, supra note 53.
241
See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1243–46, 1252–68. Professor Fallon notes,
“With incommensurability and indeterminacy limiting the autonomy of the individual categories, the gestalt-like quest for coherence that is modeled by constructivist coherence theory . . . fulfills an important function in our constitutional practice.” Id. at 1252.
242
As Judge Cardozo noted almost a century ago, “It may not have been the
same principle for all judges at any time, nor the same principle for any judge at
all times. But a choice there has been, not a submission to the decree of Fate[.]”
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921).
While that choice can become predictable for any judge over time, without any
guiding formula, the ultimate choice is up to the judge’s own sense of prudence.
243
Ely, supra note 57, at 17.
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4. TRUE ORIGINALISM AS THE BEST APPROACH FROM ANY
PERSPECTIVE
As was discussed in Part III of this Article, the natural law theory
of interpretation described herein best comports with both the subjective original intent244 and objective original meaning245 of the
Constitution. As discussed in Part IV, there are reasons to believe
that the natural law theory described herein also represents the best
moral theory from a consequentialist perspective,246 a current consensus or Dworkian perspective,247 a progressive historicist perspective,248 and thus from a pluralist perspective (since it reflects a combination of all the other perspectives).249
As was noted earlier,250 Justice Kennedy has stated, “Had those
who drafted and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight.” A few recent Supreme Court Justices have approached constitutional interpretation
from this properly humble Enlightenment natural law perspective:
most prominently, current Justice Kennedy and former Justices
O’Connor and Souter.251
V.
CONCLUSION
Judges like Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Neil
Gorsuch have claimed legitimacy for their interpretive approach in
the humble view that they are just following the original meaning of
the Constitution.252 That is not so. They are imposing on the Constitution an interpretive structure that would have been foreign to the
Constitution’s framers and ratifiers, leading to decisions that have
no connection to how the framers and ratifiers would have expected
244

See discussion supra Section III.A.
See discussion supra Sections III.A–C.
246
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 230–31.
248
See supra text accompanying notes 238–39.
249
See supra text accompanying note 178.
250
See supra text accompanying note 119 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578–79 (2003)).
251
See supra text accompanying notes 102–05, 119, 124–29, 144–49. See also
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 12.3.2; 12.4.1–12.4.3, at 375–78, 393–403.
252
See supra text accompanying note 13.
245
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their Constitution to be interpreted today. Imposing on that Constitution a static/formalist interpretive methodology does not make
practical sense. The main consequence of such an approach is a predisposition to support the values of an earlier white, propertied,
straight male patriarchal society.

